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Too often, studies on il Risorgimento, and on modern Italian history in general, 
tend to undermine or fail to acknowledge the efforts and agency of the peasantry in the 
critical moments of Italy’s history, and the extent to which these contributions (however 
unwittingly) paved the way for various political ends. This thesis thus seeks to give credit 
to and shed light upon the unsung heroes of il Risorgimento and Italian history, the 
masses of hard-working, faithful individuals that have always striven tirelessly against 
the historical injustices that have plagued that ill-fated peninsula. 
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ABSTRACT 
ROBERT CORBAN: Liberal Policy and the Peasant Condition in Garibaldi’s Sicily, 
1860 
(Under the direction of Chiarella Esposito) 
 
 This study seeks to document and detail the historical narrative and experience of 
the Sicilian peasantry at the time of Italian unification or, as the entire movement is 
commonly called, il Risorgimento. Focusing principally on the period between Italian 
revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi’s successful expedition in the first few days of April 
1860, throughout the next six months during his brief prodictatorship and on into the 
months and years immediately following Sicily’s annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia, this 
thesis represents a much-needed contribution to the new school of revisionist scholarship 
on il Risorgimento. It does not refute the findings of previous revisionist interpretations 
of this movement, and indeed reiterates the conclusions of a number of scholars and 
historians’ works before it in that it finds that the actions and liberal policy decisions of 
Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime resulted in the further perpetuation of the already-
impoverished status of the peasantry in Sicilian society. However, it does draw upon new 
sources to assert that the peasantry’s choice to revolt in April 1860 as well as in the six 
years following the annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia in October was indeed a rational 
decision, and one that signals the achievement of some level of political and social 
consciousness that was not present or realized before this time. These sources include the 
correspondence of the British consuls stationed in Sicily at this time, a series of 
agricultural reports commissioned by the Italian parliament and a diary from one of 
vi 
 
Garibaldi’s troops, as well as a range of secondary literatures. This thesis also offers a 
critique of the essentialist practices and scholarship of proponents of meridionalismo, or 
the rough equivalent of Edward Said’s ‘orientalism’ as manifested in the southern half of 
the Italian peninsula. It also presents the theoretical concept of a ‘collective social 
defense mechanism’ embedded in Sicilian society, which has been brought to life and 
cemented at the center of Sicilian culture by a number of actors and occupying powers 
throughout history. This mechanism accounts for the state of poverty endured by the 
Sicilian peasantry throughout much of the nineteenth century as well as the gross levels 
of crime, corruption and injustice that are still apparent on the island to this day. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This project was born out of the naïve intention of discovering the fundamental, 
root causes of il Problema del Mezzogiorno and of answering the perennial Questione 
Meridionale, both of which refer to Southern Italy’s apparent inability to ‘modernize’ 
along the same lines as its northern counterpart. Understanding the reasons and meaning 
of the general lack of economic development in Southern Italy has confounded scholars, 
politicians and citizens of Italy for centuries though, and the solution to this problem and 
the answer to this question do not emerge in a form that any remotely concise work could 
hope to encompass. In examining this problem, one is faced with an intricate, nuanced 
dynamic of historical forces and actors that have manifested themselves in the very 
localized manner that historical themes and continuities so often do in Italy. In this 
regard, a drastic narrowing of scope and limitation in temporal and spatial context is a 
critical prerequisite in conducting scholarship on the Mezzogiorno. 
 One exemplary avenue for exploring these issues is Sicily, the sublime, sun-baked 
isle whose inhabitants have for centuries suffered the most from the socioeconomic and 
political deficiencies that have long characterized the southern half of the Italian 
peninsula. In many respects, this island also constitutes and exemplifies some of the gross 
impediments to success in the modern global economy that greater Italy suffers from. 
Indeed, the famed Italian sociologist Luigi Barzini framed it as such, stating that 
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“Sicily is the schoolroom model of Italy for beginners, with every Italian quality and 
defect magnified, exasperated and brightly coloured.”1  
 Similarly, while both Italy and Sicily’s problems prove recurrent throughout their 
respective histories, certain moments exist wherein opportunities for sociopolitical 
development seemed to have been most egregiously missed. Foremost among these is il 
Risorgimento, the nineteenth-century movement for unification that resulted in the 
creation of the nation-state now bearing the name Italy.  However, until the last half 
century or so, a great historiographical divide has hindered the interpretation of this 
event. Driven forward by the teleological interpretations of liberal and Marxist historians 
alike, a great, mythic narrative of the Italian Risorgimento has developed to prevent its 
accurate representation. The liberal camp espouses a story of an unbridled and 
revolutionary nationalist vigor, driven forward by a united body of skillful diplomats, 
politicians and revolutionaries: the legendary Garibaldi, the skillful and cunning Cavour, 
and the proud and elegant King of Savoy. Its Marxist opposition frames this movement as 
something quite different: a story of factionalism, regionalism and political 
trasformismo,2  a story of clandestine diplomacy and political subversion, veiled by the 
birth of nation and nationalism. For Marxist historians, the Risorgimento marked the 
construction of a mere façade of political unity, an egregious practice in ‘unconditional 
                                                          
1 Luigi Barzini, The Italians: A Full-Length Portrait Featuring Their Manners and Morals (New York: 
Touchstone 1996) 252. 
2 Marxist scholar and founder of the Italian Communist Party Antonio Gramsci discusses this term in his 
most renowned work, breaking it down into two types of “trasformismo,” the relevant case in this instance 
being that of “molecular” tranformism, or the manner in which “individual political figures formed by the 
democratic opposition parties are incorporated individually into the conservative-moderate ‘political class’ 
(characterized by its aversion to any intervention of the popular masses in state life, to any organic reform 
which would substitute a ‘hegemony’ for the crude, dictatorial ‘dominance’)” Antonio Gramsci, Ed. 
Quintin Hoare. Trans. Geoffrey Nowell Smith. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971) 58. 
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unitarianism,’3 and the ultimate perpetuation of the social and political divisions that have 
plagued peninsular Italy since the fall of the Roman Empire. For the Marxists, il 
Risorgimento represented a flawed attempt at a true revolution, a “passive revolution,” as 
the school’s founder Antonio Gramsci declared it. Indeed, national unity stood as a noble 
gain and accomplishment, and one that would prove to alter the course of European and 
world politics for years to come, but what were the social consequences for the masses of 
this Italian brand of Realpolitik? What could have happened differently? Could Cavour or 
his opposition in Giueseppe Garibaldi or Giuseppe Mazzini have acted in such a manner 
as to prevent the calamitous social consequences that resulted from this process? Indeed, 
if they could have, why did they choose not to? 
The Marxists have been unable to depart from these sorts of counterfactual 
endeavors. Both of these approaches have also been influenced and their findings 
obscured by the presence of a certain meridionalismo, or the rough Italian equivalent of 
Edward Said’s ‘orientalism’ as manifested and bestowed upon the inhabitants of the 
southern half of the Italian peninsula.4 Meridionalismo and its prophets (‘meridionalisti’) 
have served to perpetuate images of southern difference and ‘backwardness,’ as well as 
southerners’ supposedly inherent ‘vulgarity’ and ‘criminality.’5 It was not until the latter 
half of the twentieth century that a group of revisionist historians were able to transcend 
meridionalismo and build upon and learn from these earlier counterproductive 
                                                          
3 This term was first applied by the Italian revolutionary and later member of Parliament Agostino Bertani 
located in Della opposizione parlamentare [Milan, 1865]. 15. as cited in Raymond Grew, “How Success 
Spoiled the Risorgimento.” Journal of Modern History 34.4 (1962): 239-253. 251. 
4 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House 1978) 
5 See John Dickie’s Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860-1900 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Palgrave Macmillian 2009) and Jane Schneider’s edited volume Italy's 'Southern Question': 
Orientalism in One Country (London: Berg Publishers 1998) for two recent attempts to problematize and 
debunk this logic and approach. 
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historiographical debates to unravel some of the mythologized and politicized dimensions 
of the Risorgimento. Utilizing a methodological framework that seeks to account for 
localized reactions and causalities within the old meta-historical interpretations,6 this new 
generation of scholars and historians has paved the way for a refreshing approach to the 
study of the Risorgimento. British scholars John Davis and Lucy Riall, both of whose 
works will be consulted throughout this essay, represent the foremost of the Anglo-
American revisionists. With each of these new studies comes a new understanding of the 
many social consequences of the study in pragmatic politics that is Italian unification. 
Standing out amongst these consequences is the fate of the Italian peasantry, the majority 
of the Sicilian population, a segment which one early Italian sociologist characterized as 
“the backbone of the country, and . . . perhaps, the best element of the population.”7 
 A focused study of the Sicilian peasantry helps to magnify some of the historical 
sentiments and experiences of the Risorgimento, and  in doing so provides a much needed 
contribution to this innovative new historiographical approach. In order to conduct such a 
study, one must narrow the temporal scope to the months just after the landing of 
Garibaldi and his Mille (‘Thousand’) on May 11, 1860, the brief period during which 
Garibaldi was hailed as prodictator of all Sicily. Although, as the reader will see, 
Garibaldi was not present as an active administrative agent for much of this time, the 
various actors and figures that came to assume many of the administrative posts in Sicily 
                                                          
6 See Lucy Riall The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification (New York: Routledge 
Publishing 1994), for a comprehensive examination of this new school of interpretation and Robert Lumley 
and Jonathan Morris’s edited work The New History of the Italian South: The Mezzogiorno Revisited 
(Devon, UK: University of Exeter Press 1997) for an introduction to the specific questions that have been 
raised. Raffaele Romanelli provides a similar, albeit more concise, analysis to the same effect in his 
“Political Debate, Social History, and the Italian Borghesia: Changing Perspectives in Historical Reseach” 
The Journal of Modern History 63.4 (1991), 717-739. 
7 Luigi Villari, Italian Life in Town and Country (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1902), 187. My 
emphasis. 
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at this time combine to forge an adequate model for examining il Risorgimento and all of 
its sentiments, benefits and discontents. Furthermore—much like the role of the Sicilian 
peasantry in general—this critical moment represents something that is generally 
neglected and amalgamated in the history of modern Italy.  
This thesis thus serves as an original, albeit minute contribution to the school of 
insightful revisionist historiography that has fortunately come to characterize many of the 
recent interpretations of the fateful moments that saw the birth of the modern Italian state. 
Much in the same temporal and theoretical vein as Denis Mack Smith’s famed work 
Cavour and Garibaldi, this thesis provides a portrait of the previously neglected role of 
the peasantry in il Risorgimento, or the “background to the struggle,” and the “raw 
material on which Cavour and Garibaldi had to work in the decisive phase of this 
revolution,” as Mack Smith has put it.8 The following contribution does not refute 
traditional Marxist or revisionist hypotheses that the institution of the Piedmontese 
constitution, the Statuto Albertino, further disenfranchised the already-impoverished 
peasantry. However, it draws upon new sources to offer a systematic and detailed 
analysis of the various liberal elements of Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime, and explains 
how each of its policies predated, but also worked in conjunction with the blanket 
application of the Italian constitution and the localized elements in Sicily to further 
distance the peasantry from the necessary resources to achieve social, political and 
economic viability. At the same time, it seeks to emulate the microstoria popularized by 
Italian historians of the 1960s and 1970s and accentuate the role of specific relationships, 
networks, actors and individual decisions throughout this process, and thus highlight the 
                                                          
8 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi 1860: A Study in Political Conflict (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press 1986), 2. 
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critical elements of agency, causality and rational action that are generally missing from 
previous approaches, whose logic too often falls into that of their characteristically 
monolithic approach. What emerges from this study is a narrative that closely adheres to 
Lucy Riall’s interpretation of the same period, aptly entitled “Ill-Contrived, Badly 
Executed [and] . . .of no Avail’? Reform and its Impact in the Sicilian Latifondo (c.1770-
1910),”9 for the brief period of Garidbaldi’s prodictatorship was nothing if not a tragic 
lesson in administrative and governmental mismanagement and a case study in the 
devastating effects of liberal reforms on local economies in Southern Italy. From their 
attempts to implement and enforce a policy of conscription to the their approach 
regarding land reform and the confiscation and misappropriation of ecclesiastical 
property, Garibaldi’s regime was an egregious failure for which the Sicilian peasantry 
paid the ultimate price of another century of poverty, anguish and ‘miseria.’ Contrary to 
the liberal and Marxist interpretations of this movement, then, this thesis will conclude 
that the violent reactions of the peasantry, the ‘plague’ of brigantaggio (‘brigandage’) 
and the civil war that raged on the island for almost a decade after Italy’s political 
unification can in no way be attributed to any sort of inherent rebelliousness or 
lawlessness embedded in Sicilian culture. Rather, these events must be examined and 
understood as the product of a collective social defense mechanism, of sorts, driven 
forward by rational forces and the beginnings of a social consciousness amongst the 
Sicilian peasantry.  
                                                          
9 Lucy Riall “Ill-Contrived, Badly Executed [and] . . .of no Avail’? Reform and its Impact in the Sicilian 
Latifondo (c.1770-1910)” from Dal Lago, Enrico, and Rick Halpern. The American South and the Italian 
Mezzogiorno: Essays in Comparative History. (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002). 
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In drawing these conclusions, this thesis will consult a range of primary sources 
often cited in early accounts and interpretations of the movement. Among these are 
Garibaldi’s Secretary of State Francesco Crispi’s memoirs and the agricultural reports of 
Sidney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti, whose exhibition to Sicily in 1876 marked one 
of the first official investigations into the dire social, economic and political conditions of 
the island at this time. However, this study will also examine the diary of one of 
Garibaldi’s troops and the correspondence of the British Consuls in Italy. These latter 
documents will provide important context, as well as offer relatively detached, objective 
and fresh accounts of the revolt and discord that raged in Sicily following the declaration 
of the newly-united Kingdom of Italy. The range of revisionist secondary literatures cited 
in this text works toward a similar end, and it is also to these sources that this thesis and 
its author are heavily indebted. 
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I. THE PEASANT CONDITION IN SICILY IN 1860 
 
 
Geography and topography serve as two of the principal forces throughout 
Sicily’s long history. The island covers an area of 9,830 square miles a mere two miles 
off the tip of the boot of the Italian peninsula, and is the largest island in the 
Mediterranean as well as what amounts to the basic epicenter of the great sea.10 Hailed 
since antiquity for its raw beauty, Sicily’s position in the center of the Mediterranean has 
functioned to cast the isle as a perennial setting in the many dramas that have played 
themselves out upon the great European lake. Inevitably, too, its inhabitants often took 
the form of the victims—the victim of a relentless villainy—a mass of oppressors coming 
from every direction. Sicilian culture has retained souvenirs from each of these 
encounters and subsequently developed into a rich and idiosyncratic cultural landscape of 
nearly unparalleled proportions.11 However, these oppressors have left a much less 
generous legacy in terms of the political and sociological effects of their respective 
occupations, as a profound and renowned distrust of the state seemed to cement itself, 
perhaps justifiably, within Sicilian culture in such a manner that persists even to this day. 
This sentiment was omnipresent during il Risorgimento, and this pervasive notion has 
come to be recognized as one of the most characteristic elements of the Sicilian 
                                                          
10 Figures taken from "Sicily" in the  Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 
Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2012. Web. 30 Jun. 2012 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/542800/Sicily>. 
11 For a recent attempt at accounting this storied past, see Sandra Benjamin’s Sicily: Three Thousand Years 
of Human History (Hanover, NH: Steerforth 2006). 
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condition. One could reasonably hypothesize that such a central location might have 
resulted in Sicily flowering as a commercial hub, but this indeed was not the case, and 
Sicily’s geopolitical location facilitated instead its exploitation by a variety of historical 
actors. 
The island’s topographical characteristics have been inextricably intertwined with 
the region’s development as a sociopolitical unit and have historically lent themselves to 
what many great civilizations have hoped to exploit for agricultural production and 
surplus. The Romans most notoriously utilized the island as nothing more and nothing 
less than their vast, living-and-breathing granary. Sicily’s agricultural output served as an 
important component in the lifeblood of Roman and subsequent civilizations while also 
providing for the subsistence of the Sicilian native population, as grain and wheat 
products have long proven a staple of the Sicilian diet. Such prosperous and fruitful 
practices slowly dwindled following the death of antiquity, however, and a very different 
picture began to emerge. The content of the rich soil that housed the great Sicilian wheat 
plains remained the same, as natural geological processes continued to wash the topsoil 
down from the mountainous terrain in portions of the island, but a force of a very 
different nature emerged to counteract the potential benefits of these natural processes 
and gave birth to what one observer described as such: 
. . .in the uplands of the interior one comes face to face with a  sun-baked, treeless 
and waterless soil which in its asperity and poverty seems to defy the will of 
man—a will which, if present, is sometimes malevolent and bent upon the 
perpetration of grave social injustice.12 
                                                          
12 Survey of Southern Italian Economy (Rome:SVIMEZ, 1950) 5. My italics 
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 Successive foreign occupations by Germanic, Muslim, French and Spanish 
peoples gave birth to a class of resilient, opportunistic landowners who would come to 
dominate the island for centuries.13 This human element of Sicily’s agricultural history 
will serve as the focus of this portion of this essay, and the central question: with such 
favorable geographical and topographical conditions that had allowed for the general 
welfare and prosperity of its population for centuries, what happened to Sicily to give rise 
to the deplorable state which became increasingly, and painfully, evident in modern 
times? And furthermore, how was this state of affairs perpetuated and this practice 
allowed to continue in the democratic epoch? 
 
 Lying at the very heart of these questions is the historical nature of agricultural 
organization and production in Sicily. The vast, desolate stretches of land referred to as 
the latifundia had, by the nineteenth century, firmly situated themselves in the rural 
Sicilian landscape and rendered the island an oasis of static and essentially feudalist 
agricultural practices which defied the dynamic modernizing forces surrounding it. So 
all-encompassing and pervasive was the influence of the latifundia that some historians 
have found them to dominate over half the island’s landscape.14 The notoriously low 
yields and levels of productivity that accompanied these vast stretches of land prevailed, 
and were understood by observers as ‘natural’ developments due to the historical lack of 
capital and poor agricultural conditions on the island. Denis Mack Smith describes the 
variety of agriculture practiced in Sicily as such: 
                                                          
13 See Benjamin’s Sicily for an introduction to this story, as well as a relatively concise overview of these 
occupations and this historical development. 
14 This estimated figure is taken from Denis Mack Smith’s “The Latifundia in Modern Sicilian History” 
Proceedings of the British Academy 51 (1965): 85-123, 86. 
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For centuries they had grown cereals alternating with rough pasture, and in such a 
predatory manner that the land gave only one crop of wheat in three years and 
usually less than nine bushels an acre. This low yield was though quite natural by 
most farmers, for Sicily’s economic dilapidation over the centuries had been 
generally accepted with the hopeless resignation of the Gattopardo, and it was 
assumed that the laws of nature—climate, soil, lack of capital—left no alternative 
to this extensive kind of agriculture.15 
This sort of agricultural organization had crucial implications for not only 
economic production, but also for the structure of the social hierarchies and systems of 
power in the Sicilian countryside, which in turn ensured its continuity. 
 In the early nineteenth century, cultural and social resonance generated by the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupation of Italy resulted in an upsurge of 
political awareness among the Italian middle class and from this ensued a series of 
concurrent investigations into the feudal state of agricultural and social organization in 
the Mezzogiorno.16 These investigations resulted in calls for land reform, particularly 
from Professor Abbé Balsamo. Combined with the abolition of feudalism and heightened 
levels of agricultural production during the British occupation of Sicily from 1806 to 
1815, Balsamo’s reports exposed some of the damages wrought by the oppressive social 
hierarchy.17 These investigations revealed a system of ownership wherein largely 
absentee landlords and aristocrats, many of whom resided far away from their estates in 
Palermo, Messina and at times as far as the mainland, reaped the benefits in prestige 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 87. Mack Smith is using the term ‘Gattopardo’ here as a reference to the protagonist in Giuseppe 
Tomasi di Lampedusa’s famed work Il Gattopardo. Don Fabrizio Corbera, Prince of Salina, represents the 
archetypal Sicilian landowner, whose habits of absenteeism and general neglect for his land are exemplars 
of this group’s agricultural practices. Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa Il Gattopardo (Milan: Feltrinelli 
2002). 
16 Raymond Grew “Finding Social Capital: The French Revolution in Italy,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 29.3 (1999): 407-433. 426. 
17 Mack Smith, “Latifundia in Modern Sicilian History,” 90-92. 
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gained from owning such large tracts of land.18 They enforced this status quo through a 
system of patronage, clientelism and often violence that ultimately perpetuated the drastic 
disparities in wealth and equality in the ungoverned Sicilian interior. Central to the 
maintenance and upkeep of this oppressive system was the parasitic third party of the 
gabbellotti, the managers of the estates and ultimate “arbiters of the destiny of the rural 
poor.”19 These individuals often subletted each tract of their landowners’ territory as 
much as two or three times and required and enforced exorbitant rates of interest upon the 
peasantry in such a manner that barely allowed for subsistence.20   
This cyclical process yielded a most precarious and unstable state of living for the 
peasantry, in which the typical risks assumed by nineteenth-century European farmers 
represented the least of their concerns. One observer characterized this state of affairs as 
such even at the beginning of the twentieth century: 
The peasant has no security or tenure, and may be deprived of his holding on the 
shortest notice, so that he has no interest in keeping the land in good condition; 
and as his share is so small he has no incentive to work hard or well. He merely 
works because he knows that his landlord will not actually let him die of hunger, 
lest there should be no one to plough the fields.21 
 
In this sense, the landowners had little interest in improving the lot of the 
peasantry or the state of Sicilian agriculture. As Mack Smith states 
 
                                                          
18 Sidney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti offer one of the first vivid accounts of this network in their 
groundbreaking 1876 two-volume Parliamentary investigation La Sicilia nel 1876 (Firenze: 1877). 
19 John Davis Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth Century Italy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press International, 1988). 85. 
20 Sonnino’s account offers a detailed analysis of these contracts and their regional and localized 
manifestations throughout Sicily, referring to their arbiters and enforcers as “il grosso gabellotto” (243), 
extracting and exploiting the labor of “il vero impresario dell’industria agricola . . .i contadini” (243). 
21 Villari, Italian Life, 195. 
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To them the land was a symbol of prestige and so could not lightly be transferred 
to more active and capable hands. Instead of intensifying production to meet the 
needs of a growing population, they preferred to extend still further up the 
mountain-sides with the same superficial and semi-nomadic cultivation which 
characterized the latifondi.22 
These ‘latifondists’ thus enjoyed an anachronistically but distinctively feudal 
dominance over the peasantry. Sonnino characterized these relations as such: 
The latifondista was always baron-like, and not only in name: the way the worker 
stood in relation to the landowner remained that of a vassal in relation to a feudal 
landlord.23 
 
 The landowners employed and utilized the gabbellotti as a means of maintaining 
the status quo in the countryside. These gabbellotti were often found occupying the ranks 
of the middle classes in the hierarchy of Sicilian society, and their aspiring attitudes and 
practices often mimicked those of their aristocratic employers. Sonnino goes on to 
describe this class with great disdain. 
the bourgeoisie, not very numerous, there like everywhere else,  is hungry for 
gain, and imitates the aristocratic classes only in their foolish vanity and lust for 
domination.24 
 
These individuals, many of whom would assume roles as mafiosi following 
unification, combined with other members of the landowning classes to prevent (at times 
violently) the emergence of a class of small landholders. In doing so, they prevented any 
                                                          
22 Mack Smith, “Latifundia in Modern Sicilian History,” 91. 
23 Sidney Sonnino, La Sicilia nel 1876: I Contadini (Firenze: 1877). 176. Translated text: “Il latifondista 
restò sempre barone, e non soltanto di nome: e nel sentimento generale la posizione del proprietario di 
fronte al contadino, restò quella di feudatario di fronte a vassallo.” My italics. 
24 Ibid., 176. Translated text: “Vi è poi la classe della borghesia, non molto numerosa, e là, come 
dappertutto, avida di guadagno, e imitatrice della classe artistocratica soltanto nelle sue stolte vanità e nella 
sua smania di prepotenza.” 
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significant gains in the efforts for land reform enacted by the Spanish in 1792, the British 
in 1812 and 1815 and the Bourbons in 1824 and 1841. These reforms sought to eradicate 
the remnants of feudalistic practices, but ultimately only increased the legitimacy of these 
relations in Sicilian society by privatizing property.25 This allowed landowners and 
gabbellotti to continue utilizing their strong-arm tactics and influence, and solidified the 
latifundium and its exploitative and oppressive social dynamic at the center of Sicilian 
society. 
The subject of this thesis involves yet another instance of flawed state 
intervention in 1860: one of the many failures or Garibaldi’s revolutionary regime 
became the most exemplary case of gattopardismo.26 However, before moving forward, a 
note on the nature of patron-client networks in rural society is necessary, as these sorts of 
relationships and their impact on the behavior and condition of the peasantry function as 
one of the principal determinants in the ineffectiveness of reform in the case of 
Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime.  
John Duncan Powell claims that certain basic patterns of individual and group 
relations emerge within peasant and agricultural societies which peasants attempt to use 
as a means of gathering resources and capital in response to a foreign threat.27 These 
include the maintenance of extensive kinship networks and the establishment of clientele 
                                                          
25 Denis Mack Smith’s work referenced above provides evidence and testimony to this fact in a more 
extensive fashion. 85-123. 
26 Gattopardismo, literally translated as “leopardism,” is again a reference to Giuseppe Tomasi di 
Lampedusa’s aforementioned work Il Gattopardo in which he illustrates in beautiful prose the dynamics of 
social change at the time of il Risorgimento, summed up in the character Tancredi’s infamous line, “Se 
vogliamo che tutto rimanga com'è bisogna che tutto cambi.”  
27 John Duncan Powell “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” American Political Science Review 64.2 
(1970): 411-425; 411-412.  
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and patronage systems with those of differing wealth or status.28 Duncan Powell also 
asserts that state centralization and market expansion serve as the two processes most 
responsible for the flourishing of these relations, and that such liberal elements further 
transform these relationships and systems into politicized power-brokering mechanisms 
by which the patron in the relationship can extract the continuing political support and 
material dependency of the client.29 These generalized characteristics of peasant societies 
are clearly evident in the Sicilian case, as these power mechanisms had become firmly 
entrenched within Sicily’s socioeconomic hierarchy by the time the movement for Italian 
unity began. In this manner, the Sicilian peasants were effectively captured within a 
vicious and inescapable cycle of poverty and oppression, and their only apparent rational 
economic response was to remain within it, borrowing money in times of need from their 
patrons at exploitative levels of interest that combined with the debts suffered from their 
original contracts. Sonnino describes the state of the peasantry and their suffering at the 
hands of this usura, unchanged ten years after Garibaldi’s expedition, in the bleakest 
terms: 
Usury renders impossible for the Sicilian peasant any savings, any improvement 
of his lot; and worse still, it keeps him in a continuous state of legal subservience 
and moral depression, and it takes away every liberty, every sense of true dignity. 
The Sicilian peasant is almost constantly indebted, either to his master or to 
strangers. . .  And whoever gathers per fas aut nefas, just a nest egg of some 
several hundred lire, is able not to work at all, live in idleness and in vice, usury 
exercises an unbridled influence on the peasants: a useful member of society 
become ipso facto a dangerous parasite to the social body.30 
                                                          
28 Duncan Powell, 412. The argument could be further extended to include some of those practices and 
attitudes deemed ‘amoral familism’ or ‘nepotism’ as rational and evolutionary responses to the same sorts 
of pressures. See Barzini’s classic The Italians, particularly the chapter entitled “The Power of the Family” 
for an interesting take to this point. 
29 Duncan Powell, “Peasant Society,” 413. 
30 Sonnino, 182-183. Translated text: “L’usura rende impossibile al contadino siciliano ogni risparmio, ogni 
miglioramento della sua sorte; e peggio ancora, col tenerlo in un stato continuo asservimento legale e di 
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 However, a second rational option and course of action existed for the Sicilian 
contadino (‘peasant’): revolt. In 1860, the failure of past agrarian reform combined with 
these endless systems and networks of social servitude, as well as with a great and 
renewed detest for the brutal Bourbon police systems, to forge a vehement popular hatred 
for all systems of authority and the beginnings of a mass movement in Sicily 
unprecedented since the Sicilian Vespers in the thirteenth century. Similar to the Vespers, 
which were a reaction against oppressive French authority, the Sicilian countryside arose 
in 1860 in what appeared to the world as a desperate cry for help and deliverance, and 
what appeared to all of those Italian patriots and partisans seeking Italian unification to be 
a revolutionary powder keg to be tapped and exploited for their own means and ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
depressione morale, gli toglie ogni libertà, ogni sentimento della propria dignità. Il contadino siciliano è 
quasi costatemente indebitato, o verso il padrone o verso estranei . . .D’altra parte basta a chiunque di aver 
raccolto per fas aut nefas, un gruzzolo di qualche centinaio di lire, per non lavorare più affatto, e per vivere 
nell’ozio e nel vizio esercitando l’usura la più sfrenata sulla classe campagnuola: costui da membro utile 
della società, diventa issofatto un parassita dannoso del corpo sociale.” Italics in text. 
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II. The Expedition of I Mille and the Rise of the Revolutionary Peasantry 
 
 
The City was beset with numerous troops awaiting, but in vain, the expected 
descent of the peasants from the mountains in full force. The Signal of revolt was 
given from the Gancia convent, the bell of which loudly rung brought together a 
motley and ill armed crowd wearing tri-coloured cockards and crying “Viva 
Italia e Vittorio Emmanuele!31 
 
Such a riveting account of revolution and insurrection as recalled by John 
Goodwin, the British Consul at Palermo, certainly gives color to the grand narrative of 
the Risorgimento and its origins in the countryside of Palermo. However, this report 
neglects and obscures some of the basic facts of the peasant revolts occurring in Sicily at 
this time, and furthermore exemplifies and foreshadows the egregious politicizing of such 
a courageous display for the means and ends of the liberal revolutionary regime. In fact, 
this revolt in particular, and the rise of the peasantry in April 1860, were both devoid of 
any sense of a unified political program, particularly of one that involved the King of 
Sardinia. This basic fact holds a number of great implications for not only the purposes of 
this essay, but also for the course and development of the Italian historiography of the 
Risorgimento on both sides of the Marxist-liberal divide, as both the movement and the 
myth became associated with a fabricated sense of unified public opinion in favor of 
Italian unity under Victor Emmanuel II, when indeed the reality was quite the contrary.  
                                                          
31Letter from Consul Goodwin. Public Records Office (PRO). FO 70/322. 210-211. 
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 A number of nineteenth-century politicians as well as more recent historians 
agreed with Goodwin’s account of the revolt of the Sicilian peasantry in 1860.32 Indeed, 
to the objective viewer, and to the avid, idealistic nineteenth-century revolutionary, the 
appearance of such popular participation would not be unexpected, as Napoleon had 
effectively transplanted the ideals of the French Revolution throughout much of Western 
European continent by this time, particularly throughout the Italian peninsula, and the 
memories of 1848 were quite fresh.33 However, those ideas of liberté, egalité, fraternité 
and their legacy of civic engagement and social and political consciousness did not 
develop in the southern provinces as they did in northern Italy.34 Likewise, the 
revolutionary vanguards in past uprisings (such as 1848) had failed to mobilize the Italian 
peasantry as a revolutionary force in any way that would have itself provoked or 
influenced the revolt of 1860.35 Furthermore, the widespread illiteracy and relative 
physical isolation of the peasants of the Sicilian interior meant that the promulgation and 
dissemination of any political program in the countryside was next to impossible.36 Thus, 
it can be concluded that the revolt of the Sicilian peasantry in 1860 involved social and 
material grievances arising out of mounting frustration at the seemingly inexorable plight 
                                                          
32 For a compelling example of such revolutionary idealism and unfounded generalization of popular 
sentiment in favor of a unified Italy, see the excerpts featured in H. Nelson Gay’s “Garibaldi’s Sicilian 
Campaign as Reported by an American Diplomat.” American Historical Review 27.2 (1922): 219-244.   
33 For a well-written and extensive documentation of this fact, see Raymond Grew’s “Finding Social 
Capital: The French Revolution in Italy.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29.3 (1999): 407-433. The 
recorder of Francesco Crispi’s memoirs likewise attested to this general feel of nationwide revolutionary 
idealism, most evident in documenting the public opinion surrounding Garibaldi’s departure, claiming that 
“the country in general, and especially the youth of the nation, in whom ideas of liberty and of nationalism 
were fomenting hotly, saw only the heroic beauty of the action, and knowing little of the true state of 
Sicilian matters, anticipated not bloody defeat but splendid victory.”  Francesco Crispi. The Memoirs of 
Francesco Crispi. I: The Thousand,  ed. T. Palamenghi-Crispi, trans. M. Prichard-Agnetti. (3 vols.;London, 
1912-14),  237. 
34 Grew, “Finding Social Capital,” 431; Denis Mack Smith’s Victor Emanuel, Cavour, and the 
Risorgimento (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 194. 
35 Grew, “Finding Social Capital,” 429.  
36 Mack Smith, Victor Emanuel, 195.  
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in which the peasants found themselves. It was the hated grist-tax, il macinato (which had 
already started one revolution in 184837), the crippling consequences of faulty Bourbon 
agrarian reform,38 the despised gabbellotti, the idle, decadent aristocracy, and the brutal 
Bourbon authorities to which all of the peasant’s hatred was geared. The peasants’ 
motives were not to be found in any sort of grandiose liberal discourse or in any party 
doctrine. This revolt was a brutal cry and a struggle for survival, and the first stage in the 
development of fledgling social and political consciousness.  As this thesis will argue, 
Garibaldi would not make the mistake of failing to initially engage the peasantry on these 
grounds, with promises of bread and land-- promises which would, due to no particular 
fault of Garibaldi’s, go largely unfulfilled.  
 Thus the narrative of il Risorgimento begins, when on April 4, 1860, Palermo 
exploded in a month long period of turmoil and insurrection that eventually climaxed in 
Garibaldi’s legendary Spedizione dei Mille (‘Expedition of the Thousand’) and the 
beginning of the most dramatic and decisive stage of the whole Risorgimento. Revolt 
having almost completely engulfed the whole of western Sicily following the famous 
‘Gancia’ insurrection (as described above by British Consul Goodwin),39 Garibaldi’s 
initially quixotic and piratical venture quickly found success in the state of anarchy that 
                                                          
37 Mack Smith, Victor Emanuel, 199.  
38 Lucy Riall explicitly details the beginnings and origins of this unrest as found in the revolutions of 1848 
in her essay “Garibaldi and the South,” taken from John Davis ed. Italy in the Nineteenth Century: 1796-
1900 (Oxford : Oxford UP, 2000), stating that “peasant agitation over the expropriation of land created 
even greater tension. Especially in the grain-producing areas (latifondi), peasants were angered by the 
government’s failure to protect them from the consequences of agrarian reform. In particular, the failure to 
compensate the peasantry for the abolition of customary rights (such as grazing or wood-gathering) and the 
enclosure of common land caused terrible hardship; bad harvests, exploitative landlords, and an inequitable 
tax system further intensified popular resentment.” 134. 
39 A number of primary as well as secondary sources document the state of lawlessness that prevailed at 
Sicily for the duration of this long month. See Lucy Riall’s Sicily and the Unification of Italy: Liberal 
Policy and Local Power, 1959-1866 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), or the section entitled “The 
Peasants’ Revolt in Sicily, 1860” of Mack Smith’s Victor Emanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971) for comprehensive accounts of such. 
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prevailed across this half of the isle. This succession of unexpected victories, which 
began in Marsala and gained momentum in Salemi and Calatafimi before finally arriving 
to Palermo,40 drew the undivided attention of a number of European leaders, particularly 
Camillo Benso Count of Cavour, the shrewd Piedmontese diplomat who watched 
fearfully as his relentless adversary Garibaldi won the hearts and arms of the Sicilian 
insurgents.41 The question arises, as it surely did for Cavour at this time: how could 
Garibaldi so effectively mobilize such a formidable revolutionary mass? And what sort of 
implications would this mobilization have for the greater success of Garibaldi’s campaign 
and for the whole of the effort for Italian unification? 
 The tactical and political strategies employed by Garibaldi and his regime took 
the simple form of several concessions and promises, the nature of which this essay will 
examine in the section below. However, it stands as of the utmost importance to 
acknowledge the sudden resurgence in enthusiasm for Garibaldi’s endeavor and his army, 
and the manner in which this excitement aided I Mille and garnered not only the 
temporary support of the Italian peasantry, but that of a number of international entities. 
                                                          
40 Sandra Benjamin’s Sicily offers a concise account of the logistical points of the expedition on pages 306-
314. For a more detailed account see the extract from a diary in Crispi’s Memoirs which provides almost 
up-to-the-minute updates of the affair. 
41 The section entitled “Cavour and the Thousand, 1860” in Denis Mack Smith’s Victor Emanuel, Cavour, 
and the Risorgimento reveals Cavour’s apparent attitude throughout the duration of Garibaldi’s embarking 
for the island, ranging from ambivalence to anger to encouraging. It is important to note, in this case, the 
difficulty in dissecting and understanding Cavour’s motives and feelings throughout the initial stages of 
this endeavour, as he found himself in the middle an intense game of diplomatic chess in which he sought 
the favor of a number of different groups and individuals, many of which held conflicting views and 
interests, most notably the French and the Neapolitans, as well as his own King and constituents. For all 
intents and purposes, though, and beyond the various interpretations of Cavour’s most controversial action 
of putting out a warrant for Garibaldi’s arrest, the general conclusion can be reached that Cavour in no way 
tangibly or financially supported or assisted the initial stages of the Expedition in any way.  
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The effect of a resurgent nationalism on the Italian was apparent, even if 
hyperbolic in some instances, and varied in strength from region to region. Francesco 
Crispi’s memoirs declare the upsurge in such romantic terms as these: 
. . .a great flame of enthusiasm swept the peninsula. The impulse to hasten thither, 
to have a part in the glory, to help in some way, seized one and all, for all now 
knew that the time had come when Italy would indeed be made.42 
 
 Encouragement and assistance, however veiled and relatively dubious in their 
manifestations, arrived from all corners of the Western world.43 Most notably, such 
assistance and general sympathy for the Italian cause came from Britain.44 The British 
had grown increasingly impatient with the repressive means pursued by the Bourbons as 
they attempted to maintain order on the island, as well as (and perhaps most importantly) 
the manner in which these practices interfered with British economic interests in the 
area.45 British vessels thus lay silently and strategically in the harbor at Marsala, with the 
likely intention of safeguarding the mission should it be intercepted by the Bourbons.46 
                                                          
42 Crispi, Memoirs, 237.  
43 H.N. Gay details one of these exchanges in his presentation of John Moncure Daniel’s account of the 
Garibaldinian expedition, recalling an instance in which “Garibaldi sauntered up to Palmer [American 
Captain of the Iroquois, a warship stationed at Palermo to protect American interests] in an unsuspicious a 
manner as possible . . . and whispered in his ear, ‘Can you let me have a little powder?’ But this would 
have compromised the neutrality of the United States, and Captain Palmer therefore replied, ‘I’m sorry I 
can’t; but I think I can tell you of a friend of mine who can’, at the same time indicating with his finger an 
American merchantman that chanced to be in the harbor. Garibaldi took the hint, went to the vessel, and 
obtained what he wanted.” A.S. Bicknell, In the Track of the Garibaldinians (London, 1861), p. 236, as 
quoted in H.N Gay, 238. 
44 Garibaldi would later be received in England as a hero and a saint, as people flocked to his person even 
in 1864, four years after his revolutionary endeavor and relative departure from politics. An account of this 
trip, as well as a brief overview of British perceptions of Garibaldi is presented in Derek Beales’ essay 
“Garibaldi in England: the politics of Italian enthusiasm” taken from Eds. John A. Davis and Paul 
Ginsborg’s edited  volume Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento: Essays in Honour of Denis 
Mack Smith. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
45 Riall, Sicily and the Unification, 67. 
46 Benjamin, Sicily, 310. 
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 Most notorious among contemporary observers as well as histories composed 
since then, though, was Garibaldi’s ability to appeal and inspire courage and the flames 
of Italian nationalism within the common man, as seen in the declarations of undying 
love and loyalty of his soldiers47 as well as the actions of those commoners he interacted 
with and influenced. This exchange will be viewed more in depth below, as Garibaldi’s 
successful landing and his first proclamation represents one of his first appeals to the 
peasantry, in an attempt to depict his political program as one principally aimed at 
mitigating their material anguish. For now, though, it is important solely to acknowledge 
the presence and effectiveness of this charismatic ability, and the extent to which 
Garibaldi and his regime were able to generate mass appeal and manufacture Italian 
nationalism. These notions are of the utmost importance and centrality to this essay, as 
they contributed to the ability of Cavour’s liberal regime to wholly and ultimately hijack 
the unification effort for itself by playing upon these themes to amalgamate the myriad of 
diverse interests of the inhabitants of Sicily in 1860.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 An excerpt from poetic private Giuseppe Abba’s famed The Diary of One of Garibaldi’s Thousand 
exemplifies such adoration: “What could we, a few thousand men, have done if he had not been our leader? 
Could all the Generals of Italy rolled into one, with all their skill, have done what he has done? There was 
need of a heart like his, perhaps of a head like his, and that face that makes one think of Moses, of 
Charlemagne, of some Warrior Christ! You only had to see him to be won over.” Giuseppe Cesare Abba, 
Trans. E.R. Vincent The Diary of one of Garibaldi’s Thousand (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) 
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III. Garibaldi’s Dictatorship and its Deficiencies 
 
 
‘You mean, one territory; as far as the people are concerned, one or many, they are 
bound to suffer and they go on suffering and I have not heard that you want to make them 
happy.’ 
 ‘Of course! The people will have liberty and education———‘ 
 ‘Is that all?’ broke in the friar. ‘Liberty is not bread, nor is education. Perhaps 
these things suffice for you Piedmontese but not for us here.’ 
 ‘Well. What do you want then?’ 
 ‘War! We want war, not war against the Bourbons only, but against all 
oppressors, great and small, who are not only to be found at court but in every city, in 
every hamlet.’48  
  
 
This conversation between one of Garibaldi’s Mille, Giuseppe Abba, and a 
Sicilian friar, encapsulates the sort of misplaced liberal, idealistic rhetoric heralded by the 
revolutionary regime, as these wrongfully imposed notions of nineteenth-century 
liberalism served to overshadow and discredit the many voices, opinions and desires of 
the Sicilian populace. However ignorant Abba the romantic revolutionary was of the state 
of affairs in Sicily, as well as of the position of the peasantry therein, Garibaldi’s 
prodictatorial regime was not. Immediately upon the regime’s consolidation, the new 
rulers sought an explicit policy to win over the hearts and swords of the peasantry by 
issuing proclamations making promises of bread and land. These promises, however, 
directly conflicted with and were ultimately subordinated to the aim deemed by the 
regime more critical to the success of the revolutionary effort: the support of the 
                                                          
48 Abba, Diary, 54. 
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landowning classes. This portion of this essay concerns itself primarily with those critical 
months and the decisions and oft-contradictory policies sought by the newly-declared 
prodictatorial regime of Garibaldi, his unwavering Sicilian aide and Secretary of State 
Francesco Crispi, and the multitude of allied administrative actors and agents underneath 
them. Although operating under potentially irreconcilable external constraints, these 
figures effectively exploited the Sicilian peasantry as a revolutionary mass in order to 
expel the Bourbons, yet ultimately favored the interests of the landed elites to such an 
extent that the peasantry were left with no material gain from their massive contributions 
to the effort for Italian unification.  
 To provide for an adequate and thorough examination of this process, this essay 
will present the historical narrative first so as to illustrate the nature and origins of the 
policy sought by the prodictatorial administration and to introduce the individual actors 
who played a part in its construction and implementation. This essay will then further 
analyze various pieces of legislation and demonstrate that indeed, they elicited no 
improvement in status of the peasantry, but instead further separated the members of this 
peasant class from any means or resources that could provide for social or economic 
mobility. 
 
 Mere hours after the crews of the Piemonte and the Lombardo disembarked at 
Marsala around noontime of May 11, 1860, Garibaldi and Crispi summoned a gathering 
of the municipal council of Marsala at the town hall where the two issued the first of a 
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number of decrees and proclamations declaring Garibaldi’s status as Dictator of Sicily. 
Crispi’s memoirs record the “invitation” as such: 
Proclaim Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, and his representative, Garibaldi, 
Dictator of Sicily. Invite all cities and towns of the Island to follow your example. 
Your proclamation will be the starting point of the political transformation of our 
country.49 
 These calls to action would be heard days later in Salemi and Calatafimi, and 
from these epicenters calls to expel the Bourbons reverberated throughout the island. 
Chaos erupted, administrative bodies disintegrated entirely, and those individuals 
representing any brand of authority found themselves in mortal peril and at the mercy of 
the anarchic climate of the isle.50 This state of disorder would later come to influence a 
number of the decrees and policies of the prodictatorial government, and ultimately 
functioned as one of the most insurmountable impediments to effective administration 
and reform. At the time, though, the victory on May 15 in Calatafimi against a sizeable 
Bourbon force gave credibility to Garibaldi’s regime as a legitimate alternative to the 
oppressive Bourbons, and with this victory the charge of government and administration 
began. The first set of dictatorial decrees were issued on May 17, and in this manner the 
process of transforming the social revolt of the Italian peasantry into a political revolution 
for a unified Italy officially began. 
Garibaldi’s first dictatorial decree created the office of Secretary of State and 
appointed Crispi to the post.51 On the same day, Crispi, demonstrating sufficient 
knowledge and awareness of the failure in organizational structure of the 1848-49 
                                                          
49 Crispi, Memoirs, 174. 
50 Christopher Duggan, Francesco Crispi: 1818-1901: From Nation to Nationalism. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002.) 192. 
51 Crispi, Memoirs, 178; Duggan, Francesco Crispi, 192. 
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revolt,52 developed the outlines of the new administration. Crispi passed laws pertaining 
to conscription for all of those capable of bearing arms between the ages of seventeen and 
fifty and, most critically, abolished the tax on flour and duty on cereals, thus directly 
appealing to the peasantry so as to solicit their confidence and support.53 A day later, 
while marching toward the ultimate military goal of Palermo, Crispi submitted to 
Garibaldi a decree for the appointment of a Council of War, which would serve as a court 
martial to try any crimes committed by soldiers or civilians during the revolution, thus 
“safeguarding the honor of the revolution.”54 However, as this essay will argue, this body 
concurrently served to legitimize arbitrary acts of coercion and violence enacted at its 
own discretion, particularly to the effect of punishing acts against private property and 
ensuring the support of the landowners.55 This act represented the first in a series of 
decrees which displayed a gradual change in direction of administrative policy and intent, 
which would only be further altered following the victory at Palermo on May 27. 
 Garibaldi’s troops caught the Bourbons off guard, and, after much street-fighting, 
erecting of barricades and bombardment, the insurgents had decisively driven back the 
troops of Francis II by that afternoon.56 That same day, and the day after, Crispi presented 
for Garibaldi’s approval various acts promulgating the creation of a Comitato generale 
(‘General Committee’) and its division into various subcommittees dedicated to the 
management of the municipality of Palermo.57 On June 2 and June 4, Crispi issued his 
                                                          
52 Duggan, Francesco, 189. 
53 Crispi, Memoirs, 179-182.  
54 Ibid., 183. 
55 Ibid., 182. 
56 Duggan, Francesco, 196. 
57 Crispi, Memoirs, 222. 
27 
 
last conciliatory gestures and promises to the masses, ensuring their unfaltering support 
in favor of the revolutionary regime, proclaiming on June 2 that 
whoever has fought for his country shall receive his part of the communal lands to 
be divided among the inhabitants, in accordance with the law (of 1849, now re-
established), without being obliged to draw lots for the same, and that in case 
where the soldier has been killed, this right shall pass to his heirs.58 
 On June 4, Crispi issued a decree assuring the nurturing, education and reparation 
by the state of the children, widows and soldiers who incurred personal losses during 
their participation in the revolutionary effort.59 Crispi also abolished the residual feudal 
elements of Sicilian society such as the title of Eccellenza (‘Excellence’) and the custom 
of hand-kissing which served as symbolic impediments to the progress of the peasantry.60 
These acts and promises were met with jubilation and renewed dedication from the now 
‘revolutionary’ peasantry and ‘volunteers.’ On June 6, the Bourbon officials signed the 
armistice, rendering the peasantry’s military role a decisive one in what Denis Mack 
Smith characterized as “Italy’s most notable military success in the whole 
risorgimento.”61  
Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, Francesco’s nephew and the editor of his memoirs, 
characterizes the capitulation of Palermo and the passing of these pieces of legislation as 
the climax of the first stage of the revolution, as the Garibaldinian administration was 
now faced with a much more difficult task, that of ensuring order and creating the proper 
climate for pursuing their political aims on the island and the peninsula. Crispi’s nephew 
describes the regime as successful in its initial stages, and reveals the way it had 
                                                          
58 Ibid., 222 
59 Ibid., 223. 
60 Ibid., 224. 
61 Mack Smith, Victor, 195.  
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effectively gained the favor of the revolutionary mass as a catalyst in the victory at 
Palermo; 
Up to the second of June, Crispi had impersonated the government, legislating 
and exercising full power. This unity of direction and initiative was of inestimable 
value during that first period of revolution, when radical and decisive measures 
were necessary in order to establish the new political system upon the ruins of the 
odious system of the past. The country’s acquiescence in the action of Garibaldi 
and his Thousand, which could not have been dispensed with, was all the more 
enthusiastic and steadfast because the people immediately felt the hand of 
government in the removal of the tax on bread, felt that their needs were 
understood, knew that their losses would be made good, and protection afforded 
them. And all this they owed to the Dictatorship and to Crispi, who lent it 
intellect, heart and energy.62 
 Thus, Garibaldi’s charisma and Crispi’s political preparedness and decisiveness 
had secured the confidence and support of the urban and rural masses, and in doing so 
had secured the success of the effort to expel the Bourbons from Sicily. Indeed, for the 
most part, Garibaldi’s provisional government initially met with general popular consent, 
as the regime and its administration stood as one “which the people all acknowledge and 
obey with pleasure.”63 As Denis Mack Smith puts it, “It was long since anyone had been 
able to say so much of any government in Sicily.”64  
Following these decrees, however, and beginning in early June, Crispi began 
employing a vastly different policy-making strategy, as reflected in a statement he would 
make much later in life: 
Revolutions are of course made with whatever people you have available. The 
important thing for a statesman is to know how to get rid of certain elements 
subsequently and send them home. Sometimes their natural home is prison.65 
                                                          
62 Crispi, Memoirs, 221-222. My italics. 
63 21 May, Commander Marryat to Admiral Mundy (F.O. 70/326) as cited in Mack Smith, Cavour, 11. 
64 Mack Smith, Cavour, 11. 
65 A. Guiccioli, ‘Diario del 1888’, Nuova antologia, 12/11/1938, p 126 (2/11/88) as cited in Duggan, 190. 
My italics. Crispi even conveyed this sentiment earlier in the revolutionary effort, writing in a letter in 1856 
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 Such contempt for the peasantry and the urban masses and their undeniable 
contributions to the nationalist cause became increasingly evident in the regime’s 
policies. Many of the administration’s actions came to reflect those of a police state 
which favored order rather than social revolution. The regime implemented such a policy 
in order to appease and win the support of the landed elites, thus preventing the 
development of counter-revolutionary Bourbonist sentiments and ensuring the 
‘efficiency’ of political administration. While the steps detailed below and the policies 
certainly appear ‘necessary,’ in this respect, one must also note their damaging 
consequences in implicitly subordinating the interests of those individuals who the 
landowners exploited for their profits to their particular understanding of a united Italy. 
This change in policy came as a result of the apparent and relative dominion over Sicily 
achieved by the victory at Palermo, but also in light of new international developments.  
Crispi now had to concern himself with Cavour’s impending attempts to hijack the now 
politicized revolution for the liberal camp, which distracted him from any sort of 
sympathetic social tendencies or intentions Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime may have 
possessed.   
 Indeed, it should be noted that Crispi may have held some convictions for the 
cause of social revolution, or at the very least reform,66 being that he was indeed a 
revolutionary democrat. However, any of these concerns seem to have been swept aside 
when Cavour’s encroachment on administrative affairs in Sicily began. The divisiveness 
and subsequent mismanagement and discord created by the Cavourian elements and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to the point that “Now, to hold the Sicilians, it is necessary, for the present at least, to respect their 
traditions, good or bad as the case may be, using them to the best possible advantage the cause of the 
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agents, most specifically the antagonistic relationship between Crispi and Cavourian 
Minister Giuseppe La Farina, represents the first of a number of catalysts that drew 
Garibaldi’s attention away from advancing the social cause of the peasantry and from 
enacting any sort of effective legislation whatsoever. Those all-too-familiar echoes of the 
1848-49 revolution could be heard, in this instance, as those nightmarish political 
divisions which resulted in a brutal Bourbon counterrevolution seemed to be reemerging 
in similar forms.67 In many respects, the beginnings of the political movement in 1860 
mirrored those of 1848, as the revolt born out of social concerns brought to light political 
differences which fatally compromised the movement’s success.68 These memories only 
increased the sense of urgency surrounding the effort for Italian unification.  
Just a day after the Bourbons signed the armistice in Palermo, Cavour’s envoy La 
Farina arrived on the shores of Sicily and immediately began to sow the seeds of discord, 
rallying around him a party opposed to the administration of Crispi, whom he despised 
and envied as a result of Crispi’s close relationship with Garibaldi.69 A dispatch headed 
for Turin, dated three days after La Farina’s arrival, although rife with faulty assertions, 
accounts and assumptions, serves to demonstrate both the aims of Turin and the vanity 
and malice with which they would be pursued. La Farina spoke of his former friend and 
fellow exile Crispi’s “utter incapacity” and the people’s gross disregard and disrespect for 
the government, claiming that “No one believes it can endure, and its authority is laughed 
at.”70 La Farina only further damaged his own credibility as a truthful observer, claiming 
that “all come to me for advice and direction. In the streets I am greeted with enthusiasm, 
                                                          
67 Riall, Sicily and the Unification, 81. 
68 See Denis Mack Smith. A History of Sicily: Modern Sicily After 1713 (New York: Dorset Press, 1968), 
415-425 for a concise summation of this story. 
69 "The Breach Between Garibaldi and the Annexationist Party." The Economist 21 July 1860: 783-84. 
70 Crispi, Memoirs, 247-248. 
31 
 
while no one thinks of saluting those in power,”71 and that “disorder is great, and might 
easily discourage one not born in Sicily, but I feel myself sufficiently strong to conquer 
it.”72 One cannot help but marvel at the audacity and explicit pretension of such a figure, 
particularly when he ends his rash dispatch with a statement to the point that “I cannot 
allow Sicily to be ruined by machinations of rascally or foolhardy individuals,”73 as if the 
whole of the effort for unification depended on the participation of this man. However, as 
this essay will demonstrate, in some ways it did. 
 All accounts indicate that Garibaldi received La Farina with coldness, giving him 
every assurance that his administration was in control and that his services were indeed, 
unnecessary.74 La Farina received scant attention from the dictator until a month after his 
arrival, when Cavour’s agent had brought about enough discord and popular discontent 
with his propaganda and libelous accusations of Crispi that Garibaldi dismissed him from 
Sicily. The official release, as reported in a July 21, 1860 issue of The Economist states 
that Garibaldi banned La Farina for 
. . .conspiring against the actual order of things. The Government, which is 
vigilant for the public tranquility, and should not be the least disturbed, could not 
any longer tolerate the presence amongst us of such individuals, who had come 
here with culpable intentions.75 
 However, La Farina had succeeded in his mission, and this fact cannot be 
overstated. By conducting a largely successful smear campaign against Crispi and his 
government, La Farina firmly implanted the plausibility of annexation to Piedmont firmly 
within the popular Sicilian consciousness, going so far as to persuade the civic council of 
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Palermo to register an official motion for annexation (which an infuriated Garibaldi in 
turn firmly rejected).76 Nonetheless, La Farina was a significant impediment to effective 
administration in Sicily, and in this way La Farina himself gave some truth to his 
accusations of governmental inefficiency, leading to a distinct decrease in support for the 
prodictatorial regime. Likewise, his ability to capitalize upon and proliferate the rumors 
of ‘Mazzinianism’ and ‘class war’ circulating among the urban elites in the streets of 
Palermo, inspired enough fear and discontent to ultimately deal a deafening blow to the 
credibility and ability of Garibaldi’s government. This led to Crispi’s forced resignation 
on June 27, and although July 7 marked La Farina’s permanent disappearance from the 
island, an irreparable wound had been inflicted upon the democratic cause. 
Although Crispi remained largely influential during the subsequent Secretariat of 
Depretis, and indeed small successes were had by the democratic front in July, any 
republican cause at this point was lost. With Garibaldi being forced to leave Palermo to 
attend to military matters on the isle and the mainland, whereby the island lost the man 
around whom the Risorgimento was fixated, the political climate in Sicily became 
increasingly polarized, and the isle’s administration all but forgotten. A complete analysis 
of this greater political and diplomatic narrative stands outside of the scope and breadth 
of this essay, but the most critical element to understanding the nature of these 
proceedings is the role played by La Farina, whose subliminal and destructive influence 
in Palermo served as a catalyst in preventing the effectiveness by which the Garibaldinian 
administration could carry out reforms or enforce laws during that critical month of June 
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1860.77 Scarcely covered in scholarship on the Risorgimento, La Farina in this respect 
deserves recognition as one of the most influential figures in the whole of the effort for 
Italian unification. 
 
Garibaldi’s administration was also forced to act within the external constraint of 
a gross lack of finances and resources. Lack of sufficient ammunition haunted Garibaldi’s 
troops from the beginning,78 and upon the capitulation of Palermo this translated into an 
inability to effectively enforce and ensure the upkeep of law and order on the isle, 
particularly when all arms available had been diverted to the liberation front. Abolition of 
the macinato, however critical for the gathering of peasant revolutionary support, meant 
the elimination of what had been the largest source of governmental revenue on the island 
for the Bourbons.79 This simple quandary in and of itself is an adequate example of the 
sort of inherently contradictory policy sought by Garibaldi’s regime. Reintroducing this 
policy, or attempting to levy any other sort of new taxation, would have proved 
disastrous, and certainly unsuccessful, as the lack of arms or general semblance of order 
prevented the establishment of any legal authority to which the Sicilians could be 
expected to respond. On June 9, Crispi, in light of the barren state of the Exchequer in 
Palermo, attempted to pass such tax measures to benefit those incurring losses due to the 
revolution and Bourbon bombardment.80 But, as much of the city had been destroyed by 
this bombardment, and normal commercial activity not yet restored, it can be reasonably 
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assumed that these policies were merely symbolic, at best, and perhaps a last effort at 
encouraging the Sicilians. Given the severe poverty still being endured by the mass of the 
populace, and the uncertainty and fear of class war felt by the elites in light of the 
revolution, charitable donations to the nationalist cause were nonexistent. 
 
Bearing these political and economic limitations in mind, following the sealing of 
the armistice at Palermo on May 29 (and what essentially amounted to that of the entire 
island other than Messina), the provisional government embarked on a radically different 
path in terms of policy. As mentioned previously, this strategy departed from the earlier 
one pursued during the ‘radical’ stage of the revolution. Crispi, and even more so his 
successor to the secretariat, Agostino Depretis, now understood that their initial policy 
represented one in which the two aims of mobilizing the support of the masses, on one 
hand, and ensuring order, political success, and the prevention of Bourbon 
counterrevolution, on the other, represented a contradiction in practice, and that the 
interests of the landed class of rural elites needed to be weighed more heavily if success 
was to be achieved. In practice, this policy translated into the creation of a National 
Guard, the institution of ‘mobile columns’ of volunteers and carabinieri to police the 
countryside, and a period of unprecedented violence, military justice and repression in the 
Sicilian interior. At times indistinguishable from the roaming bands of deserters and 
bandits plaguing and wreaking havoc throughout the island, and at other times utilized as 
mere extensions of the power of local elites, these forces clashed with centuries-old, local 
family disputes and local rivalries in what became a bloody civil war. Simply put, one 
could not easily distinguish from the small armies now employed by the fearful 
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landowners, the legal authorities of the newly established regime, and the brigantaggio 
(‘brigandage’) now rampant in the countryside. 
This policy of coercion began on May 29, when upon the capitulation of Palermo 
many of the laws proclaimed in Salemi on May 14 were instituted. These included those 
laws pertinent to the leva (conscription) and the construction of the Council of War and 
the national militia. Capital punishment was also mandated for murder as well as theft 
and pillaging, the latter two acts, it should be noted, being related to private property, and 
thus only relevant for those landowners who could suffer such losses.81 Popular 
discontent swelled, and became directed against all means of authority, including the new 
government, as the peasantry realized that the promises made by Garibaldi would go 
unfulfilled. Whereas previously Garibaldi had been able to control and even direct the 
frustrations of the peasantry, he now perpetuated their discontent and gave it new cause. 
The introduction of liberal free-trade legislation later would only exacerbate these 
tensions and heighten the number of riots and popular demonstrations.82 Crispi’s nephew, 
sympathetic as his bias most certainly is, claims that from this point forward, “Crispi 
never failed to impress upon the authorities he was gradually instating that all attempts on 
property must be punished with relentless severity.”83 
Most demonstrative and notorious of these cases of military justice stands as that 
of Bronte, an insurgency crushed by one of Garibaldi’s most ruthless generals, Nino 
Bixio, then serving directly on the Council of War. Bixio, a man characterized by British 
Consul Goodwin at Palermo as “for harshness and severity is unexampled in Sicilian 
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history”84 embarked upon a bloodthirsty purge of the villages surrounding Mount Etna in 
early August and arrived at Bronte, where, according to Abba, “terrible rioting had 
broken out,” resulting in “arson, vendettas, fearful orgies” and “division of property,” 
(the latter of which should be noted as bearing strong resemblance to those promises 
made by Garibaldi a mere three months before).85 Bixio took swift action, declared 
Bronte in a state of siege, confiscated all arms under pain of death, disbanded all forms of 
municipal organization, issued a war tax (unlikely to be affordable or paid), and 
sentenced the allegedly guilty parties to a court martial, resulting in what some accounts 
declare six executions86 and others, as many as thirty.87 Abba describes among those 
executed a sixty-year-old man and “cultured, gentle young men in red shirts; doctors, 
artists and the like.”88 The historian and Italian deputy Giuseppe Ferrari would later 
characterize these individuals as “the first victims of a social war.”89 Bixio went on to 
enact similar punishments in Randazzo, Castiglione, Regalbuto, Centorbi and other 
municipalities,90 warranting this description by Abba: 
They called him a savage brute, but they dared not do more. However far the 
fortunes of war take us away, the terror of witnessing this man’s tempestuous 
wrath will suffice to keep the population of Etna quiet. If not, this is what he has 
written: ‘We won’t waste words; either you keep orderly and quiet or, in the name 
of Justice and Country, we’ll destroy you as enemies of humanity.’91 
 Bixio’s dangerous jump to declare the interests of the country (and his particular 
understanding of the country) as the same as those of humanity represents, in this case, a 
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perilous and fatal view that would have direct consequences for the Sicilian peasantry. 
These matters were of little importance to the provisional government, though. More vital 
was the appeasement of those landed classes and assurance of “a complete restoration of 
good order”92 necessary for securing the success and permanence of the effort for 
unification. Doubtless certain circumstances and cases emerged when such force was 
necessary, but one cannot help but speculate as to how many cases of unwarranted 
wanton violence occurred from such pretences when in reality circumstances may have 
been much as those described by Abba, when upon arriving upon the scene of an 
apparent bread riot at a baker’s shop, he related: 
I said to Bozzani, ‘We’d better hurry before they sack it.’ On reaching it, 
however, we saw there was no rioting; people were taking their loaves, paying for 
them, and making way for others. A gentleman told us that his family had eaten 
nothing since the previous day as they had been caught by the revolution without 
provisions in the house.93 
 Regardless, as the next decade reflects, these measures, similar to all of those 
implemented by the regime, proved largely ineffective, as chaos remained the order of 
the day.  
 
The creation of the National Guards did not mitigate this problem, as the 
responsibility of their construction was left largely to those officials appointed to the 
heads of local councils by Crispi (a concerted and in this context relatively successful 
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effort at winning the favor of local elites which will be explored later in this essay).94 
This resulted in the bestowing of legal authority and legitimacy to both the pre-existing 
agrarian power structures and the violent bands of thugs they employed to assure order.95 
Referencing the Garibaldi’s administrative priorities at this time, Denis Mack Smith 
states: 
His first need was for stable government, and hence he welcomed that the 
National Guard should develop out of private security organizations employed by 
the landowners, even though this might eventually mean capitulation to one side 
in the social struggle which was now cutting across the political fight for 
freedom.96 
 These measures thus only effectively fomented the already anarchic state of the 
interior, as all of these localized loyalties and clientelist patronage networks clashed with 
the brigands in what manifested itself as an essential class war which would eventually 
give birth to what we now refer to as the mafia. At this juncture, it should be noted that 
these were indeed rational responses and reactions to the imposition of these laws rather 
than behavioral deviations as the meridionalisti might presume (more on this below). In 
any event, despite the use of brute repression, the Garibaldinian administration was still 
unable to enforce any sort of legislation it concocted, regardless of its intent or the 
audience to which it catered, the peasantry or the landed elites. This utter failure 
manifested itself most apparently in the government’s embarrassing inability to enforce 
the leva. 
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One of the first pieces of legislation passed by the provisional government, this 
attempt to recruit a militia was met with open defiance and in some instances blatant 
disregard from the beginning. In fact, many scholars credit this attempt as one of the 
foremost causes of the popular discontent that plagued the isle.97 Crispi’s biased nephew 
declares the unwillingness to serve the state as something engrained within Sicilian 
culture, claiming that “The Sicilians were not accustomed to compulsory service, and 
considered it an intolerable burden.”98 This essentialist and generalizing explanation does 
not seem to hold up, though, as a number of peasants had aided the expedition in 
Palermo, and support did not begin to wane until July, when all hope for social reform 
was lost.99 In any event, this edict met with so much repulsion and neglect that the 
government was finally forced to make concessions and modifications to the law in the 
hopes of gaining any support at all. Crispi, still hoping to salvage any authority and pride 
the administration had left, wrote to one of his governors: 
The regulations concerning conscription must be obeyed. We are willing, 
however, to modify the clauses that are at variance with popular prejudice. 
Substitution will be permitted and only sons exempted. I demand one thing only, 
that these modifications be made to appear as already inherent to the law, and not 
as concessions on the part of the government, whose authority must be 
safeguarded.100 
 Unfortunately, Crispi would never learn that arrogance and disillusionment do not 
make for effective administration, and the above concession and the provisional 
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government’s inability to enforce conscription on any level, serve as exemplary cases of 
this Italian patriot’s administrative denial and mismanagement. 
  
 These policies of the provisional government combined with fundamental 
elements of nineteenth-century liberal reforms in a manner that proved fatal for the 
peasantry. That is to say, Garibaldi’s administrators, in the following instances, was not 
guilty per se of blatantly and consciously subordinating the needs of the peasantry for 
reasons of greater political significance, but were instead merely naïve, in a sense, as to 
the historical circumstances and condition of the Sicilian peasantry. However, this 
naivety and the subsequent misplaced imposition of liberal educational, religious and 
agricultural reforms resulted in equally catastrophic consequences for the peasantry as 
did those policies of intentional coercion and oppression. It was in light of the failure of 
these reforms that the notion of ‘Piedmontization’ began to appear incompatible with the 
case of Sicily and particularly with that of the Sicilian peasant. At the very least, these 
efforts at instituting liberal reforms arrived too late in the revolutionary process. The 
provisional government’s attempts at educating the masses prove extremely relevant, in 
this case. 
The Casati law established compulsory education along Piedmontese lines, but 
proved irreconcilable with the peasant condition in Sicily. Given the chaotic state of the 
interior, and the lack of effective economic or agricultural reform (detailed more below), 
the peasant child remained on the farm with his or her family, continuing in assisting and 
aiding the family’s meager attempts at subsistence just as he or she had before the 
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revolution. Evidence of this can be seen in Sonnino and Franchetti’s report, as in 1871, 
87 percent of the total population of Sicily was illiterate, a percentage that, by Sonnino’s 
estimate, was entirely composed of peasants.101 In the same respect, as in the past, the 
landowner and agriculturist had no vested interest in improving the state of his human 
capital as a means of increasing agricultural production through education. As Denis 
Mack Smith characterizes it: “latifondisti not only were content with a 2 per cent return 
on their money; they often seem to have made it a point of class pride to leave their 
estates derelict and barren.”102 Furthermore, any attempts at educating the masses would 
only lead to revolt. As Sonnino puts it: 
 
Was it perhaps this neglect by the upper class only due to carelessness and 
indifference, or did it rather stem from the instinctive consciousness that 
instruction given to the peasant in their present conditions would only ferment 
discontent and could become a stimulant to the spirit of rebellion and future 
disruptions?103 
Thus, the liberal notion of mass education proved incompatible with the pre-
existing state of the Sicilian peasantry, as no effective social or economic legislation had 
been passed to liberate these individuals from their responsibilities at home and their 
feeble attempts at subsistence. To make matters worse, any charitable institutions through 
which the peasantry could have attained these sorts of resources were abolished with the 
passing of liberal, anti-clerical reforms. These measures were to be found among the first 
of Crispi’s edicts, as he dismissed and abolished the Society of Jesus and the Order of 
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Redemptorists from the island, “in consideration of the fact that the Jesuits and 
Liguorians were the most steadfast supporters of despotism during the unhappy period of 
Bourbon occupation.”104 He then nationalized their vast holdings of land, which covered 
a tenth of Sicily.105 Garibaldi and Crispi, both notorious anti-Catholics,106 instituted these 
reforms with such stringent sentiments of anti-clericalism that they neglected to account 
for the rather idiosyncratic, pervasive and vital positions of the priests in Sicilian society, 
and the role they played in initially supporting the peasants’ social revolts.107 This 
relationship differed markedly from the perceptions held by both Garibaldi and the 
liberals, undoubtedly influenced by their experiences and observations of the parasitic 
clergy in other, wealthier parts of Italy. Even Abba, young and innocent as his musings 
are, held this disdain for the Church, particularly the Augustinian monks, stating; 
They did the honours of their monastery dresses in black cassocks, sleek and 
greasy. The monastery is secluded, a tranquil backwater, a place to grow fat in. 
The monks are like trees in a garden whose soil drains all the good from the rest 
of the village.108 
 Sonnino paints a vastly different picture of the priest in Sicily, hailing him as one 
of the only social services available to the island’s populace.  
The priest is the only person who consoles him [the worker or peasant] with 
words of affection and charity; at least, if he doesn’t help, sympathizes with him 
when he suffers; treats him like a man, and talks to him of future justice that will 
make up for the present injustices. Religious worship is the most sacred part of 
peasant life: apart from that he only knows work, sweat and misery.109 
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 Sonnino goes further to express his liberal opinions in regards to the harmful 
effects of religious superstition in general and the manner in which these customs and the 
Church will “forever rule the masses.”110 However, he acknowledges that, given the lack 
of sufficient social and economic reform in Sicily, the liberation from these forces 
represented a temporary impossibility, and that the state had only served to remove the 
material benefits of these charitable institutions. This meant the jobs of an estimated 
15,000 laymen alone in Palermo, as well as those services of the Church that catered to 
the poor and destitute, were lost.111 
The policy aimed at Church and the nationalization of its lands is inextricable 
from the land reform undertaken by the Garibaldinian prodictatorship. This project’s 
utterly egregious failure generated grave social and economic consequences that fatally 
undermined all of the regime’s liberalizing efforts and ultimately sealed the fate of the 
Sicilian peasantry. This agrarian program consisted of several radical measures and 
phases. These edicts were first issued on June 2, and thus probably bore the same stamp 
as the other promises made to the revolutionary peasantry at this time. However, if put 
into practice with the proper accompaniments, this program had the potential to be 
effective, and could have avoided infringing on the established rights of the landed elites, 
with great implications. Denis Mack Smith regards it as such: 
agrarian reform, quite apart from considerations of political expediency and social 
justice, would have been an indispensable prerequisite for making the revolution 
of 1860-1 into the real turning-point of Sicilian history which many people had 
hoped.112 
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Needless to say, it was not put into practice in such a manner, as the elements of 
‘Piedmontization’ seeped in to destroy such prospects, and the program only made 
matters worse in Sicily. The first phase of reform promulgated the redistribution of 
Crown land among the peasantry on June 2.113 The island’s new prodictator, Antonio 
Mordini, initiated an even more radical and concrete measure in October, allowing for the 
transfer of 230,000 hectares of Church and Crown land into leases meant to provide for a 
class of smallholders to emerge.114  Cavour’s eventual political coup d’état in October 
thwarted this effort though. Realizing these lands could be auctioned off at higher prices, 
the new political class enlarged the units of land to be sold. Abuses and gross 
monopolization of holdings ensured, as financial gains enjoyed precedence over the 
assurance of holdings or justice for the peasants.115 It is not hard to imagine how the 
violent means of the gabellotti and the nascent mafia (in most cases indistinguishable 
from one another) and the established clientelist and patronage systems came into play, in 
this regard. Any peasants who were willing and able to stand up to these pressures were 
without the adequate credit facilities to do so.116 As one scholar states, “A piece of land is 
only a necessary, but not sufficicent, condition to allow the peasant to escape the world of 
la misera.”117 The result: the consolidation and preservation of the pre-existing power 
structures of the Sicilian agrarian hierarchy. Sonnino and Franchetti demonstrate in detail 
the proceedings of the auctions in their reports, but they can be accurately be summed up 
in Sonnino’s introductory statement: 
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with rents and falsified contracts, here just as in the communal allotments of the 
whole of Sicily, all of the lots went into the hands of the rich landowners. As for 
the land surveyed by the ecclesiastical board, there was never any need for 
falsification, and in the whole of the island, all of the surveyed lands went to the 
rich landowners and capitalists.118 
 The only way to perhaps reconcile these liberalizing, profit-seeking measures by 
the state with the interests of the peasantry would have been the reintroduction of the 
‘promiscuous rights’ of grazing, hunting and wood-collecting on the common lands. As 
Sonnino describes, 
For the peasant landowner, the small holder, and also the simple laborer, these 
rights were a veritable wealth, and a source of well-being all the more invaluable 
because they were not affected by the passing crisis, because these rights were 
inherently communal and inalienable.119 
 However, with all of Cavour’s emphasis on privatization, there was no hope for 
these prospects. In the end, all of these lands passed on to the class which now, according 
to Sonnino, “horded all of the things once deemed as communal.”120 Again, this failure 
revolves around the similar quandary facing the measures pertinent to compulsory 
education (which were undoubtedly well-intentioned) involving the nature of the Sicilian 
ruling class, and the manner in which the liberal regime prized their political consent and 
the content of their pocketbooks above all else. In sum, Lucy Riall details the harsh 
reality of the situation: 
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As a result, the chances of land reform succeeding in Sicily depended on a group 
of men whose entire livelihood depended on the reform failing. Agricultural 
diversification was entrusted to class grown rich on grain, who drew a substantial 
profit from rent and who would perceive little material benefit from 
commercializing their crop. Men whose wealth and security derived from ‘the 
frenzied exploitation’ of a debt-ridden labour force were expected to allocate land 
to the peasantry, thus freeing them from exploitation. The disappointing, even 
disastrous, results of land reform in Sicily can largely be traced to this 
fundamental fallacy.121 
  
 Finally, the act of legislatively bestowing legitimacy to this powerful, oppressive 
class and the injustices suffered by the peasants that resulted from this process represent 
the most critical elements to understanding the consequences of Garibaldi’s provisional 
government in Sicily. Crispi’s administrative delegation of authority gave political 
legitimacy to these traditional agrarian hierarchies, and transformed them into 
powerbrokers who cemented the fate of the Sicilian peasantry. This action represented 
the final nail in the coffin for the chances of Sicilian democracy and popular 
participation. This, it should be noted, was a conscious decision by the provisional 
government, to favor the interests of the elites and to appoint them to various 
administrative posts to gain their political backing. Undoubtedly, the chaotic, anarchic 
state of the island factored greatly into this decision. The rural elites seemed at this point 
to be the only element able to influence, control and subdue the rebellious activity in the 
countryside. However, this logic operates on the premise and a priori notions that the 
radical factions of the Sicilian populace were incapable of independently adhering to and 
participating in governmental procedures. Scant evidence exists that would support this 
hypothesis, as in the failed political experiment of 1848 all radical elements (even those 
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from the upper classes) were excluded from the interim parliament’s proceedings.122 
Likewise, speeches and reports given in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1861 indicate 
that violent crimes subsided following the capitulation of Palermo and only intensified 
when the peasantry began to comprehend the new trajectory of the regime’s policy in late 
June and July of 1860.123 Crispi’s choice to favor the landed elites thus represented the 
triumph of faulty logic which favored expedience and subservience over liberty and 
equality. 
It was in this general line of reasoning that on May 17, Crispi appointed 
governors to all twenty-four districts of the island, and bestowed upon them all 
administrative authority in their respective lands.124 These structures bore much similarity 
to the Piedmontese administrative system.125 The majority of these appointments proved 
themselves to be poor decisions on the part of Crispi, to say the absolute least. Nepotism, 
the pursuance of personal vendettas and rivalries, and gross abuses of power of all sorts 
became the norm in such a way that “gravely compromised every principle of 
bureaucratic rationality and centralized control”126 and gave unprecedented power to 
these local elites. As Franchetti reports: 
The extremely small class that had already dominated in large part public and 
private affairs, came necessarily to power with a new authority and influence 
given by the Government, and the more its power grew the more is used it to 
assume the characteristics of a direct monopoly that exclusively benefited 
themselves.127 
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Why, then, would Crispi choose such figures to serve as leaders in the new, 
liberal State? As John Davis says, “to ensure the political success of the mission.”128 Such 
a decision, and its devastating social outcome, showcases the consequences of this sort of 
pragmatic politics. Crispi’s faulty appointments thus combined with Depretis and 
Mordini’s centralizing and ‘Piedmontizing’ efforts to perpetuate the rise and prevalence a 
wealthy rural political class and a decisive and self-serving voice in the forging of the 
new state. These sorts of political entities, based on largely on clientelist networks and 
reliant on largely-illiterate peasant constituencies, consistently prove to be what one 
scholar deems ‘accommodating’ “flexible” and “pragmatic.”129 In this case, these phrases 
function as mere euphemisms for the harsh realities that were ‘parasitic,’ ‘opportunistic’ 
and ‘undemocratic.’ These elements quickly became so powerful and so pervasive that 
not even the Italian State could check their power, and instead the state itself became an 
instrument of the wealthy. Franchetti, in infamous terms, offers this morbid eulogy of the 
death of liberty and democracy, and the failure of the new Italian State: 
This is how the Government, in searching for the favor of the local elements, saw 
its concessions turn into its loss, and where they sought to use the dominant 
classes as an instrument, the government became instead an instrument 
themselves; to the point that at the times they seemed to have any power, it 
signified they were controlled by a local party.130 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conceduta dal Governo, e più crebbe il potere di questa classe, più l’uso che da essa ne veniva fatto assunse 
il carattere di un monopolio diretto ad esclusivo benefizio di chi lo esercitava.” 
128 Davis, Law and Order, 52. 
129 Duncan Powell, “Peasant Society,” 422. 
130 Franchetti, 382. Translated text: “Così il Governo, nel cercare di affezionarsi gli elementi locali, vede le 
sue concessioni voltate a suo danno, e dove cerca di farsi della classe dominante uno istrumento, diventa 
invece instrumento di lei; al punto che se talvolta sembra aver forza alcuna, vuol dire che è venuto in mano 
ad un partito locale.” 
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 This transition of power came with its expected consequences for the Sicilian 
peasantry. Once in place, successive local governments abandoned all calls for land or 
social reform that would have benefitted the peasantry.131 In fact, they tended to do just 
the opposite, and local taxes on land were all but eradicated, whereas those on food were 
exponentially raised, the burden of which fell upon the peasantry.132 Plans for the 
development of public works programs were abandoned, and instead geared toward the 
creation of lavish theatres and status symbols in the name and under the auspices of the 
wealthy landowners.133 These actions resulted from the power, authority and legitimacy 
ultimately and originally bestowed upon them by the Garibaldinian administration. Years 
later in 1877, Leopoldo Franchetti would try to call attention in the Italian Parliament to 
these continuing injustices in these compelling terms: 
And the more a ministry boasts of being liberal and progressive and governing 
according to the will of the country, the more it governs Sicily in every detail 
according to the interests of the extremely small class that dominates there. . .134 
 This state of affairs would be solidified and cemented at the center of Sicilian and 
Italian politics when the plebiscite for annexation to the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia 
was held on October 21, an event with legal and social ramifications that would lead to 
almost a decade of bloody, civil conflict and a full-fledged class war on the island, whose 
consequences can be seen to this day. 
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IV.  The Plebiscite, the ‘Piedmontization’ of Sicily and Civil War 
  
Away with all political strife! No party has the right to force upon our country 
any one particular set of social guarantees. This right belongs to the nation alone, 
and when the nation has conquered it may be trusted to establish just that 
constitution which will secure to it the fruits of victory for ever.135 
       Francesco Crispi, Memoirs 
 
 These romantic words written by Crispi mere months earlier undoubtedly seemed 
in October as though they were transcribed in another lifetime. By this time, the radical 
cause was all but lost. Garibaldi now faced a mandate to hand over his spoils to Victor 
Emmanuel II, who was to be named the first king of a united Italy, a decision the 
disenchanted revolutionary announced on October 15.136 The plebiscite in Sicily, 
conducted six days later and resulting in a resounding ‘sì’, put the first of a series of 
finishing touches on the shape of the new Italian state. However, this vote represented a 
mere formality and another step in what would become a prolonged and extensive 
process of unification that in many ways remains incomplete. The façade of Italian unity 
had been effectively created, but did not fit as comfortably upon some regions of the 
peninsula as it did others, Sicily being a case in point. With this façade’s imposition as 
well as that of its accompanying laws and regulations came an intensified level of 
upheaval and unrest on the island to such an extent that martial law and a ‘state of siege’ 
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had to be declared twice in order to supress the conflict.137 The purpose of this section is 
thus to examine the nature of the plebiscite in Sicily, the beginnings of the attempted 
‘Piedmontization’ of the island, and the rational responses (of both the peasantry and 
other groups) and long-term consequences that resulted from this process. 
  
 The days leading up to October 15, 1860, marked some of the most tense in the 
whole Risorgimento. Crispi, still influencing political affairs on the island to the best of 
his ability, delayed the declaration of a plebiscite until the latest possible moment, 
awaiting Garibaldi’s response to Victor Emmanuel’s ‘invitation’ to join a free and united 
Italy.138 Following the general’s affirmative response, word was sent to all corners of the 
island that a plebiscite was to be conducted six days later. Registered Sicilian voters were 
to respond with either a ‘sì’ or a ‘no’ to the proposition that ‘the Sicilian people desire to 
form an integral part of Italy one and indivisible under Victor Emanuel as their 
constitutional king.’139 Purposefully crafted without reference to ‘annexation’ of any sort 
and carried through in a manner so as to elicit the unanimous response desired by the 
Piedmontese regime, the plebiscite represented a mere formality, in this respect. For this 
reason, Cavour and his underlings gave little thought to extending ‘universal suffrage’ to 
all literate Sicilians. While such an action could have appeared perilous in its application 
to such an uneducated, easily-influenced populace, Cavour by this time understood 
Sicilian politics as a mere extension of the networks of power, patronage and clientelism 
so deeply entrenched in the island’s sociological landscape. Likewise, voting was 
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performed publicly in the town centers for all to see, and in this manner subject to every 
kind of external influence.140 It takes little imagination to understand how this translated 
and intensified in the smaller, more remote villages. Denis Mack Smith description places 
the few qualified Sicilian peasant voters in context: 
Outside the big towns, in areas where villages were still feudal and where 
landowners had made up their minds that Piedmont offered the best hope of 
restoring order, the publicity which surrounded the voting meant an almost 
compulsory ‘sì’. In some places, for instance Trapani. . . the ignorant peasantry 
fled to the mountains, under the impression that the voting was only a plot to 
inveigle them into an ambush and then press them for military service.141 
 In this sense, all that was required in order to achieve the intended results of the 
plebiscite was the proper and successful production of an elaborate show, of sorts, and a 
hearty celebration to follow. The liberal regime succeeded, in this regard, and the results 
yielded a nearly unanimous vote in favor of annexation. Mack Smith places the final vote 
in Sicily at 432,053 to 667, with 238 of the 292 voting districts having no negative votes 
whatsoever.142  A few days of widespread public jubilation followed, even if its 
participants did not know or understand the cause of their celebration. As one observer 
recalled: “the affirmative vote meant to the great majority the inauguration of an age of 
economic and social prosperity: no one then imagined it could conceal a new slavery.”143  
 This simple fact was soon realized, as upon the implementation of the 
Piedmontese constitution, the Statuto Albertino, the reforms the majority of the Sicilian 
populace had grown to detest under the Garibaldinian administration were given 
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legitimacy and a permanence that they never had before. The widespread response to the 
reinstitution of these policies took on that of a state of unprecedented revolt and (now that 
Italy existed as an independent country) ‘civil war.’ Brigantaggio flourished, and any 
semblance of order or government disappeared from the countryside. The disenfranchised 
Sicilian peasants geared their discontent and defiance at the same targets it had before the 
plebiscite, such as the officials and institutions supporting the despised leva. However, 
their response now took on the form of a reaction against the liberal elements embedded 
in the Piedmontese constitution, including free trade legislation and new systems of 
taxation. The disbanding of the Bourbon army as well as Garibaldi’s revolutionary force 
only exacerbated these tensions and increased the level of disorder prevalent on the 
island.144 In order to adequately account for and understand the nature of these reactions, 
each of these elements and occurrences must be analyzed individually, beginning with 
the policy of conscription. 
 As this essay has demonstrated, the leva occupied a particular place in the Sicilian 
public imagination as an exemplary manifestation of their treatment and exploitation at 
the hands of the state, and thus made for a prime target and outlet for their anger and 
frustration. Secretary Crispi’s concessions and modifications to its enforcement had 
appeased the Sicilians to some extent, but these alterations were thrown out upon the 
implementation of the new constitution in October. Protests ensued, and the new 
government had little success in enforcing this mandate over the course of the next 
decade. As early as December, speeches in the Italian Chamber of Deputies forecasted 
the prospects of the law’s implementation as such: 
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As for the ‘Leva’ in Sicily, I believe that we shall meet with still greater 
difficulties in it accomplishment than at Naples. I say this with regret, for when I 
was in Sicily I thought matters were in vain to facilitate these operations; but for 
some time past, a degree of agitation has been produced. . .I hope that this 
agitation will soon subside, that we may without any serious difficulties effect the 
‘Leva’ and that we may exhibit to Europe this grand fact that the Southern 
Provinces have contributed to the Army of Italy upwards of 45 or 50 thousand 
recruits in one year. . .I trust that when this agitation is appeased, the ‘Leva’ will 
be carried out. I trust in the patriotism of Sicilians.145 
 As the next ten years would demonstrate, this trust would prove to be misplaced, 
as Sicilians, particularly those in the countryside, still did not have an accurate 
conceptualization of the workings of the new Italian state or their roles or responsibilities 
within it. Their only past experiences with the state featured it as an oppressor which 
constantly fed upon and demanded vital human and material resources of its 
constituency. The oft-cited quotatioin of Italian author Carlo Levi’s from his Cristo si è 
fermato a Eboli (‘Christ Stopped at Eboli’) could not be more applicable, in this respect, 
as “Nothing had ever come [from Rome] but the tax collector . . .”146 This sentiment 
preoccupied Sicilian brigands to an almost fanatical degree.147 
 The sustained and legitimized enforcement of methods of taxation favoring 
landed elites and members of the parliament continued to spark public outrage. As John 
Davis describes this was the “greatest single cause of rural discontent,” and that  
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. . . nowhere was the nature of the compromises forced on the new state more 
evident than in the continuation of a fiscal system that discriminated strongly 
against the countryside and the rural population. Under pressure from the landed 
interests, the new state adopted a fiscal system in the 1860s that was based on a 
land tax that weighed more heavily on small farms than on larger estates, while 
the rural population bore the brunt of indirect consumption taxes which were 
levied on most basic necessities.148 
 This combined with a governmental interest to prevent urban disorder to bring the 
bulk of the weight of taxation on the rural population.149 Finally, the decision in 1868 to 
reinstitute the macinato, whose abolition had given life to the peasantry as a 
revolutionary force less than a decade earlier, ignited a flame of discontent that would not 
be easily quelled.150 
 New taxes worked with other fiscal and commercial policies to fatally 
compromise the position of the Sicilian peasantry in the new Kingdom of Italy. The 
disappearance of the Bourbon protective tariffs and the extension of Piedmontese free 
trade legislation crippled the Sicilian economy on a number of levels. The few large-scale 
industries that did exist and provided a means to supplement the meager incomes of the 
peasants, such as those found in cotton textile mills, were decimated.151 The effects on 
local trade and commerce were felt in both the urban and rural spheres, as artisans and 
smallholders could not keep up with such drastic changes and the pressures that 
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accompanied the sudden rise in prices.152 This resulted in workers’ strikes in the cities 
and widespread bread riots in the countryside.153 
These uprisings and the general state of unrest that prevailed on the island dealt a 
massive blow to the credibility of the new Italian state, and thus legitimized the regime’s 
brutal use of their newfound authority in mitigating the conflict. In 1862, the Italian 
government instated the Pica Law, bestowing upon the local authorities military powers 
of arrest and detention, powers which were abused by the elites who occupied these 
positions to an egregious extent.154 Summary executions, the besieging of entire villages, 
torture and the taking of hostages became commonplace, as the authorities sought to 
eradicate the scourge of brigantaggio.155 
However, closer examination reveals that brigantaggio, whose connotations in 
Italian Parliament became those of a plague that had infested and wrought havoc on the 
Sicilian interior, was in fact welcomed by all segments of the island’s population. In fact, 
the individual brigand, whether he hailed from the peasant class or the urban working 
class, assumed the characteristics of a certain popular hero for both the peasants and the 
landed elites, depending on the spatial context.156 As Sonnino evocatively demonstrates: 
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And is it perhaps surprising that the brigand finds trusted and devoted friends 
everywhere? While the landowners aid him out of fear or to use him as an 
instrument of their passions, the peasants are his natural allies, because the 
brigand, embodying the popular sentiment, taxes the landowner and is generous to 
the poor, and thus represents both a proud protest against social oppression and an 
affirmation of their individual dignity.157 
 In his study of “primitive” and “archaic” social movements among “pre-political” 
people in Western and Southern Europe, Eric Hobsbawm underscores these reactionary 
figures and movements as those characteristic of “social banditry,” and the predecessors 
of modern mass political movements. He elaborates upon this concept as follows; 
Social banditry, a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more 
than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengeance 
on the rich and the oppressors, a vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting 
of individual wrongs. Its ambitions are modest: a traditional world in which men 
are justly dealt with, not a new and perfect world. It becomes epidemic rather than 
endemic when a peasant society which knows of no better means of self-defense 
is in a condition of abnormal tension and disruption.158 
While scholarship on social movements such as these has been has been relatively 
limited, Hobsbawm hails these sorts of spontaneous outbursts as the “pre-history of 
modern labour and peasants movements,” and in this sense worthy of serious 
introspection and analysis. However, while Hobsbawm’s theorizations provide a 
necessary groundwork and foundation for further discussion, his Marxist schema and 
theoretical framework does not regard such protests against oppression and poverty as 
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political acts in and of themselves. The Sicilian peasants were not “pre-political” people, 
but—on the contrary—they were very political, albeit in different, simpler ways than 
urban-based, modern mass labor movements. 
 
The other responses to this ‘Piedmontization’ were many and varied in terms of 
their lasting consequences for the fate of Sicily and the new Italian state. While the 
majority of disenfranchised Sicilians took to the mountains, and revolted in spontaneous 
fashion against the government, other reactions took on a more organized and at times 
distinctively politicized dimension. Hobsbawm differentiates between these two 
responses as being “revolutionary” and “reformist,” the latter of which refers to the 
group’s willingness to “accept the general framework of an institution or social 
arrangement, but consider it capable of improvement or, where abuses have crept in, 
reform.”159 The emergence and organization of the mafia as a means of protecting 
property and restoring order to the countryside easily fits within this definition, and is in 
fact cited by Hobsbawm on a number of occasions as the prime example of such a 
movement.  An early Italian sociologist describes the development of the mafia as “a sort 
of vast mutual-help society, to which an indefinite number of people belong, and whose 
object is to acquire influence and power by any means.”160 Recruited from the middling 
ranks of society, particularly from the class of gabbellotti (already skilled in the brutal 
tactics of intimidation), these organizations came to play a massive role in the affairs of 
liberal Italy. As one group of scholars states: 
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. . .the state relied on them [the Mafiosi], only pretending to police their 
unauthorized use of violence. Thereafter, a succession of governing regimes in 
Italy looked the other way as mafia ‘families’ proliferated, especially along the 
‘bandit corridor’ that extended through Sicily’s western mountains and in the 
commercially rich orchard district surrounding Palermo. . .161 
In many of the towns, these families and organizations dominated communal 
councils, controlled the awarding of public contracts, bribed and intimidated judges, 
swayed elections, and ultimately monopolized the administration of liberty and justice in 
Sicily.162 This parasitic class thus became a crucial piece in the governmental apparatus 
of the new Italian state in such a resilient manner that its influence can still be seen to this 
day.163   
The second form of ‘revolutionary’ response beyond that of spontaneous social 
banditry was a number of attempted Bourbon and Republican counterrevolutions 
orchestrated by various individuals which occurred frequently throughout the bottom half 
of the Italian peninsula for the first five years after Italian unification. The disturbances in 
the Basilicata region in Southern Italy were the foremost of the pro-Bourbon movements, 
as a couple of bands succeeded in dismissing authorities and occupying cities for brief 
periods of time.164 Bourbonist demonstrations were principally limited to the mainland, 
as the regime had never enjoyed much support in Sicily. The disturbances in Sicily took 
on a more ‘red’ or ‘Mazzinian’ character, though the legendary Italian nationalist’s 
involvement in these disturbances is dubious, at best. However, as John Davis states, it 
was Mazzini’s republicanism that served as the “first and foremost the politics of the 
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discontented”165 throughout Italy both before and after unificatioin. Major “Mazzinian” 
disturbances took place in Bologna, Florence and Naples, among other large cities in 
peninsular Italy.166 Counterrevolutionary republicanism enjoyed particularly fertile 
ground in Sicily among the middle and lower classes who rightly felt as though they had 
not received their due promises from Italian unification. Davis points out the populism 
embedded in Mazzinian republicanism and its utility as an inclusive counterrevolutionary 
ideology: 
The combination of nationalism, anti-establishment protest, virulent anti-
clericalism together with a firm emphasis on the value of inter-class cooperation 
made republicanism a suitably vague yet comprehensive catch-all programme that 
was capable of encompassing many disparate discontents and resentments.167 
These sentiments and discontents came to a head in Palermo in 1866, as the city 
exploded in a state of revolt unseen since the legendary Gancia insurrection six years 
earlier that had acted as the sparkplug for il Risorgimento. A British consul offers one of 
the most authoritative accounts of the event, beginning with a description laid forth by a 
Paris newspaper: 
‘It is proof of serious discontent in Sicily,’ says a Times Paris Correspondent, 
‘that a city of 200,000 inhabitants, with a garrison of 15, 000 men allowed itself to 
be taken possession of by two or three thousand armed brigands’ . . . The union 
with Italy and the approach of  war brought about an unpopular change. 
Exemption from the ‘Leva’ was discontinued, and consumption duties were 
enhanced . . . It was resolved at private meetings to effect a revolt by means of 
brigands and outlaws . . . Early in the morning of Sunday the 16th Sept. about 400 
armed men came down and took the city by surprise. Entering the smaller gates 
and overpowering the guards, they pushed on unresisted to the centre of the city. 
By 9 a.m. all the gates except one which adjoined the royal palace were in their 
hands; by noon they had broken up the pavement and erected barricades, by 8 
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o’clock they had occupied certain monasteries with the consent or connivances of 
their inmates. The P.O., the military hospital and, after two days finally the Town 
Hall fell into their power. . . Reinforced by traitorous guards, and by the rabble of 
the town until their number was swollen to some thousands . . . For six days the 
insurgents were masters of the city, on the 7th they were driven out.168 
 Although these counterrevolutions were ultimately prevented, and order restored, 
these attempts at the very least reveal some critical implications as to the divisiveness of 
public opinion in Sicily, the general lack of regard and respect for the new Italian 
government and an exemplary case study of what Hobsbawm refers to as “the problem of 
how primitive social movements ‘adapt’ to modern conditions,”169 or, in this case, their 
imposition. 
 
The final and perhaps most devastating response to the ‘Piedmontization’ of 
Sicily was the first and largest instance of permanent emigration seen in the island’s 
history. Estimated in 1876 to be 300,000 a year from the country as a whole, the bulk of 
this flight came from Sicily and other regions where the new forms of taxation devastated 
agricultural industry and where poverty served as the most influential factor.170 Much of 
the potential source of human capital on the island thus departed for brighter shores in 
North and South America, where socioeconomic mobility appeared more possible.171  
 
Thus, the brigandage, revolt and destruction that took place in Sicily and 
throughout the whole of the Southern Italian peninsula cannot be attributed to any sort of 
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moral quality or inherent rebelliousness of the people,172 but must be located within the 
context of the application of this utterly detrimental liberal legislation. ‘Piedmontization’ 
gave way to the formation of criminal organizations such as the mafia in Sicily and the 
former Neapolitan provinces on the mainland, bloody counterrevolutions, social revolt, 
brutal reprisals and a massive flight of emigrants, all of which would prove enduring in 
their consequences. This civil war and the formation of the mafia thus cannot be 
attributed to the peculiarities and particularities of Sicily and its inhabitants as so much 
essentialist scholarship of various meridionalisti would have its readers believe. Rather, 
one must examine the way the island has been treated and administered, as these 
occurrences and organizations were born in relation and out of a reaction to the state and 
the imposition of this legislation that worsened the already dire state of poverty of the 
Sicilian peasants and their urban counterparts.  
 
One can thus deduce these developments in rural Sicily as direct, and even 
rational responses to one underlying cause: poverty. As Luigi Villari states: 
In Sicily, however, it [crime] still flourishes, and every year a very large number 
of murders and robberies are committed by bands of armed freebooters, who 
infest the rural districts. The motives of the brigands are not always robbery; 
revenge and local feuds are often as much answerable for the murders as the 
desire of gain. Still, want is at the bottom of this form of crime, as poverty is the 
chief cause of the social and moral degradation of the people of Sicily . . .173 
 
 
 
                                                          
172 Speeches in Parliament and some subsequent historiography indicated as much, as the British Consul 
recounts: “He [a Rightist representative from Bari] then made a somewhat lengthy but perfectly fair 
Statement of the Causes of discontent to be in the nature of things, and neither in the incapacity nor in the 
ill will of the King’s Government.” Letter from Consul Hudson. PRO. FO 45/9 379. 
173Villari, Italian Life, 7.  My italics. 
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Conclusion 
 
. . . all the phenomena studied in this book belong to the world of people who 
neither write nor read many books—often because they are illiterate—who are 
rarely known by name to anybody except their friends, and then often only by a 
nickname, who are normally inarticulate, and rarely understood even when they 
express themselves. Moreover, they are pre-political people who have not yet 
found, or only begun to find, a specific language in which to express their 
aspirations about the world. Though their movements are thus in many respects 
blind and groping, by the standards of modern ones, they are neither unimportant 
nor marginal.174 
     E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels 
 
They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.175 
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
 
Neither side of the liberal-Marxist divide that has characterized the historiography 
of the Italian Risorgimento has had much to say about the Sicilian peasantry’s catalyzing 
role in the effort for unification. The former, lengthy passage above, extracted from 
Hobsbawm’s larger work on the subject of ‘archaic’ social movements, represents one of 
the first attempts by a Marxist from the West to engage this sector of the population on 
revolutionary terms, as Marx himself had no patience (at least, not until his later years) 
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for this conservative force “incapable,” as he states, “of enforcing their class interest.”176 
The latter excerpt, of course, is one of the few and expectedly one of the most well-
known lines the legendary German thinker dedicated to the demographic this thesis has 
been particularly concerned with. Popularized to the point of academic cliché by Said’s 
prolific classic Orientalism, neither this line, nor Hobsbawm’s passage that precedes it 
could prove more applicable in this case, for while a concerted aim of this work has been 
to give voice or at least shed light upon the experience of the group of people Luigi 
Villari called “the best element of the [Italian] population,”177 it has sadly failed, in this 
respect. Besides the intrinsic and seemingly insurmountable impediments to cultural 
representation so skillfully posed by Said, the generally deplorable state of the archives in 
Italy, the limited number of sources at hand for this thesis’s undergraduate composer, and 
the basic nonexistence of primary source materials applicable for the purposes of 
documenting the case of an illiterate subject have all prevented serious discussion. 
However, it is the author’s sincerest hope that this brief essay has at least drawn some 
attention to this forgotten and most marginalized of groups in history, as time, modernity 
and generally irresponsible scholarship have seemed to pass them over and relegate these 
individuals to the dry confines and (at best) the margins and footnotes of Italy’s grandiose 
political histories.  
 
However, while this essay has failed in fully illustrating and representing the 
whole of the life, experience and condition of the Sicilian peasant at the time of Italian 
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unification, it has at least offered magnification of the various consciously-imposed 
liberal administrative and legislative reforms that, combined with age-old networks of 
power and patronage in the Sicilian countryside, to perpetuate the impoverished condition 
of the peasantry. In this respect, this work has at least assisted in some manner in the 
chipping-away of the thick façade of meridionalismo that has plagued far too many 
studies of the Mezzogiorno and its myriad of problems. Sicily and Sicilians are not 
‘incapable of modernization,’ and if they did prove incapable at this particular juncture in 
history, it was only as a result of what can be called a ‘collective social defense 
mechanism,’ of sorts, which has developed in response to centuries of foreign domination 
of the island. This mechanism consisted (or consists, rather) of sophisticated networks of 
patronage and clientelism, a profound distrust of the state and its appendages and a great 
value placed on the family, the latter of which so many meridionalisti have referred to as 
‘amoral familism.’178 This collective social defense mechanism can also account for the 
lack of economic and industrial development in the South, and in turn the consequences 
of these deficiencies on the northern and national economies. As one author notes: 
This particular system of social integration [patronage and clientelism] 
had a limiting effect not only on the diffusion of capitalism in the south 
but also on the national accumulation of industrial capital, as monetary 
consumption was held back by the persistently miserable conditions of the 
landless peasants and capital investment obtained better returns outside the 
country or went into land speculation.179 
                                                          
178 One must question the use of the word “amoral” in particular, here, as the only code of ethics being 
broken is that which is being imposed by an opportunistic, shrewd, malicious, and duplicitous liberal 
regime whose only concern was to impose a capitalist framework in order to better their own economic and 
political position. 
179 Enzo Mingione “Italy: The Resurgence of Regionalism” International Affairs 69.2 (1993): 305-318. 
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In the same manner, this mechanism and its activation upon being ‘Piedmontized’ 
can account for the proliferation of crime that persists to this day in both Sicily and the 
whole of the Mezzogiorno, and the ugly, essentialist stereotypes of individual criminality 
that accompany this basic trend. Again, the same scholar, though writing decades later, 
illustrates its effects 
. . .the reality of the situation is that the patronage-oriented system of 
social integration, an employment and economic structure strongly 
characterized by irregular arrangements, untenured jobs, black labour 
market activities and youth unemployment, and the lack of adequate legal 
protection for all forms of social interaction together form an 
extraordinarily fertile ground for the growth of crime.180 
Crime and corruption have now become basic facts of life in Sicily and southern 
Italy. However, these conditions, as well as those characteristics of meridionalismo listed 
above can in no way be credited to Sicilian or Southern Italian ‘difference,’ 
‘distinctiveness’ or ‘backwardness,’ but only to the actions of the state that have 
historically generated these responses. 
  
This thesis has also served to at least partially fill a large gap in the revisionist 
approach to understanding the Risorgimento.181 Indeed, while much of this revisionist 
scholarship has uncovered and espoused economically “rational” actions and reactions as 
some of the principal determinants in the shaping of modern Italy, its focus has been 
primarily on the decisions of the elite, the landowners and the opportunisti like the mafia, 
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increasingly concerned with the plight of the peasantry in Italian history. The representatives of this trend 
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rather than the peasantry. Without a doubt, if nothing else this essay has determined that 
the general unrest during Garibaldi’s prodictatorship and the civil war that raged 
throughout Sicily between 1860 and 1866, can be directly attributed to “rational” 
reactions of a group and sectors of the population whose only means of bettering and 
improving their economic condition was indeed revolt or, as Hobsbawm calls it, by 
exercising “social banditry.” Whether these individual or collective reactions were to the 
leva, the macinato, or ‘Piedmontization,’ in general, they can in every respect be viewed 
as being determined by ‘rational’ thought processes, deductions and understandings of 
their social situation, and can in this sense be seen as the development of a social 
consciousness. Hobsbawm’s contribution is critical, here, as his understanding of these 
social movements and the process of examining “the adaptation of popular agitations to a 
modern capitalist economy,”182 in addition to his body of work at large, have proven 
immensely applicable, influential and inspiring in the development of both this thesis and 
its author. However, one must take serious issue with Hobsbawm’s use of “pre-political,” 
which if nothing else represents the profound limitations inherent in the Marxist 
theoretical framework in this particular instance. Hobsbawm, the Marxists and Marx 
himself failed to realize the “political” nature of peasant protest, as the peasantry as a 
group does not fit within their limited understanding of what constitutes a social class. In 
this respect, “pre-political” must be exorcised from the quotation that opens this section, 
for while the Italian peasantry were a “people who have not yet found, or only begun to 
find, a specific language in which to express their aspirations,” their struggle to find the 
language and framework within which to act out their desires—though “blind and 
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groping”—was in and of itself a politically significant act.183 Perhaps it is fitting that this 
work departs and ends its conversation of the peasantry with a quotation of Hobsbawm’s: 
The reader of this book is not required to sympathize with revolutionaries, 
let alone primitive ones. He is merely advised to recognize that they exist, 
and that there have been at least some revolutions which have profoundly 
transformed society, though not necessarily in the way planned by 
revolutionaries, or as utterly and completely and finally as they may have 
wished.184 
  
Finally, a word of apology is in order. While this essay has attempted to draw 
attention to the generally depreciated contributions of certain groups and individuals to 
the effort for Italian unification, be they the peasants, the malicious Cavourian agent 
Giuseppe La Farina or the semiotic function of the Sicilian priest or the Sicilian brigand, 
it has left out certain populations entirely. Most notably, these include Italian women, 
who enjoy even less recognition in scholarship on the Mezzogiorno and the Risorgimento 
than do the peasants. In reality, these individuals bore the brunt of the effort for 
unification, and continue to carry the heaviest burden of the scholarship circulated and 
disseminated by meridionalisti. As scholar Giovanna Fiume describes scholarship prior 
to more recent developments, 
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The backwardness of the South was represented in the stereotype of the 
peasant woman, illiterate, forever pregnant, a supporter of the Christian 
Democrats [a particularly scathing stereotype, one might add], religious to 
the point of superstition, custodian to the honour of the men in her family. 
If in the beginning of this stereotype had a conservative matrix, it later 
significantly joined intellectuals, liberals and Marxists in a common view 
of women as obstacles to change in a peasant society that was gradually 
adapting to modernity.185 
While this study, like those that have proceeded it, has failed to feature Italian 
women as much as its author would like, and is thus prevented from purporting to have 
captured, to any extent, the entire essence of the peasantry’s experience of the 
Risorgimento, it is important to at least acknowledge and pay tribute to these individuals 
and their most marginalized of places in Sicilian and Italian society. In grave terms, 
Villari describes this position, 
But in Southern Italy the position of women is very different, and not 
unlike that which they enjoy in Mohammedan countries. In some rural 
districts, when the husband goes out he shuts up his wife in the house until 
his return. Were he to omit to do so, she would look upon it as slight. One 
may know a man intimately for twenty years without ever having seen his 
wife and daughters.186 
 
After having finished recounting this narrative, like Mack Smith I feel as though 
one more apology is due. In outlining this story, it has been the author’s intention to call 
attention to the administrative mismanagement that characterized much of the time 
during which Giuseppe Garibaldi was hailed as prodictator of Sicily. However, to level 
such a critique is unfair if it does not contain a well-pronounced acknowledgement to the 
unparalleled and courageous contributions of this Italian patriot, for whatever this 
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legendary individual lacked in administrative capability, he more than made up for it 
contributions to the heart and soul of modern Italian identity. As Mack Smith skillfully 
illustrates, in a sort of eulogy for the death of the bearded revolutionary and his dream of 
a united and truly free Italy, 
For all that he could be vulgar, irreverent, headstrong and blustering, he 
was a great man in his own way, and instinctively recognized to be such 
by the common people. In courage and capacity for energetic action he 
was second to none; but he combined with an earnestness of purpose, a 
disinterested love of his country, a zeal for social reform, and a simplicity 
of character and absence of ostentation or personal ambition, all of which 
endeared him to the multitude.187 
Garibaldi’s intentions and sympathies, as Mack Smith states, had always been 
with those of the common man, as “he believed that Italians should at all costs redeem 
themselves by their own initiative, and should not have to rely on French soldiers and 
diplomatic bargaining to win their battles for them.”188 Unfortunately, in some circles his 
contribution is only viewed as that which is summed up in by Mack Smith once again: 
“He had saved the revolution from petering out, but he had also captured it for a political 
programme.”189 The current study in no way intends to subscribe to this view beyond its 
having resulted from the connivances of the liberals in Turin, whose shrewd diplomacy 
outlasted Garibaldi’s courage and initiative in the end.  
 It is to the efforts of Garibaldi and the peasants that this study has in some way 
hoped to do justice to and confer due recognition upon, for their unparalleled 
contributions undoubtedly left an indelible and virtuous mark on the course of Italian 
history 
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